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This report to RCP Ltd and University of Canterbury summarises the findings of a 5 month 
secondment to the CERA Port Hills Land Clearance Team. Improvement strategies were initiated and 
observed. The Port Hills Land Clearance Programme is the undertaking of the demolition of all built 
structures from the Crown’s compulsory acquired 714 residential red zoned properties. These 
properties are zoned red due to an elevated life risk as a result of geotechnical land uncertainty 
following the 2011 Canterbury Earthquakes. 
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The February 2011 Earthquakes resulted in substantial damage to the City of Christchurch, in 
particular to residential properties situated on the Port Hills. Many of these properties have been 
deemed too unsafe to occupy, due to risk of rock roll, cliff collapse, landslide or debris inundation. 
Continual exposure to the elements and the resulting deterioration and a lack of maintenance has 
forced the Government to pursue the decision to clear the properties of all built structures. This 
decision is in accordance with the statutory powers of the CER Act 2011.  
Similar to the residential clearances completed on the flat lands, the Port Hills Land Clearance 
Program (PHLCP) has been established to clear as many as 714 properties (settlement dependent) 
while factoring two main elements: 
1. The technical aspects of clearance. H&S, geotechnical, structural, civil and environmental 
engineering requirements delivered in a project management context, and 
2. The non-technical and broader project requirements. (stakeholder liaison, community 
engagement, public relations, etc) 
The purpose of this report, commissioned by RCP Ltd. is to investigate improvement strategies for 
the PHLCP from an operational engineering context. This report titled “An Independent Review Of 
Project Management Processes for CERA’s Port Hills Land Clearance Programme” summarises the 
improvement strategies which may be beneficial to delivery of the programme and reflects on the 
experience as a whole. A combination of analytical, experience based and academic literature review 
was utilised to provide this feedback to RCP and ultimately CERA.  
This report finds the following: 
 The initiated improvements delivered throughout Part A suggest that contrary to the 
simplified approach required of the flat lands clearances, the Port Hills clearances face a 
greater array of complexity.  
 This additional complexity may be simplified through the use of analytical methods whereby 
large amounts of qualitative data is manipulated into quantitative data for decision making 
purposes.  
 The resolution of retaining walls related issues in a systematic approach is the final 
constraint which has potential for mitigation. All other constraints are beyond the control of 
PHLCP Project Management, or are currently being managed. 
 Through academic literature review and its applications to the PHLCP, several initiatives 
could be implemented to improve the project’s delivery. These are notably related to; 
safety, performance and risk management capabilities of contractors, procurement of 
engineering resource, the established disaster recovery model and finally comparison 
between deconstruction and demolition. 
 An insight is provided into the project management practices adopted in the PHLCP. Given 
the limitations of defining the project in the initial development stage, PHLCP Project 
Management has performed well in adhering to standard reporting techniques designed to 
ensure accountability in the operational phase of a project.  
Given the project’s multidimensional risks and diversified stakeholder involvement, it comes as no 
surprise that the complexity of the PHLCP has resulted in a delayed rebuild response. However, 
these delays come with the Public expectation and opportunity for significant planning and 
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preparation, where the greatest challenge will be completion to the high standard CERA has set for 
itself. The recommendations of this report in conjunction with a capable PHLCP Team will set the 
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1.0     PREFACE 
 
The purpose of this report is to consolidate observations from my secondment to CERA’s Port Hills 
Operations Team and to provide improvement recommendations for an effective programme 
delivery. This report satisfies the requirements of the Master of Engineering Management and aims 
to demonstrate advanced management principles applied to a complex technical application. In 
alignment with the ethos of the MEM programme, it is the intention to report to a great degree of 
brevity and of a style consistent with a consultant’s report to their client. It is expected that many of 
the suggestions developed in this report will be implemented and refined for the benefit of the 
critical success factors of the PHLCP and other relevant clearance operations.  
1.1     THE SPONSORS 
 
“RCP Ltd is an award-winning provider of professional Project Management and Project 
Programming services to New Zealand’s property industry. Since 1996 RCP has become a substantial 
specialist construction industry management consultant working on many of New Zealand’s most 
prominent developments” (RCP, 2014) 
RCP has completed a plethora of project services from commercial fit-outs, stadiums (2011 RWC 
Eden Park redevelopment, Northlands Event Centre and Christchurch’s temporary stadium), retail 
and infrastructure development, as well as traditional programme management across Australia and 
New Zealand.  
RCP has a healthy forward workload, including notable Christchurch Rebuild projects; 
 Theatre Royal Rebuild 
 Justice Precinct 
 Ongoing city wide clearance projects  
1.2     OBJECTIVES OF THE PROJECT 
 
The objectives of this project are summarised below. Project Mandate (Appendix A1) provides 
further elaboration on these key learning goals. 
 Synthesis: The ability to use and apply the knowledge gained during the MEM course in a 
holistic manner. 
 Strategic Skills: The ability to understand organisational and business issues from a strategic 
viewpoint. 
 Analytical Skills: To develop the skills needed to comprehensively analyse the environment 
and operating problems of an organisation. 
 Consulting Skills: To develop the skills needed to intervene in an organisation in a 
consultancy or intervention capacity. 
2 
 
 1.3     PROJECT MISSION 
 
 
1.4     CONTENT OF THIS REPORT 
 
This report is divided into three distinct sections which should provide a seamless flow of insight to 
the reader. Succinct conclusions are made at the end of each section and further compiled in the 
executive summary. For the reader short on time, these conclusions would provide a useful starting 
point. The appendix provides additional breadth of concepts not able to be expressed concisely in 
the main body.   
 
 PART A: INITIATED IMPROVEMENTS 
This section outlines the work completed prior to disbandment before the Xmas/New Year’s 
break. It largely comprises the progress made toward addressing the complexities regarding 
mitigation of retaining walls. A progression plan for this work and how it will be further 
incorporated is included. 
 
 PART B: NON INITIATED IMPROVEMENTS  
This section largely applies ideas and concepts from literature review and industry best 
practice. Although the improvement suggestions here have not been initiated, these ideas 
may become ‘food for thought’ for inclusion in current practice. A wide range of aspects of 
the project are covered here, not limited to safety, deconstruction & demolition, damage 
assessment, estimation and contractor capabilities.  
 
 PART C: PROJECT INSIGHTS 
This section provides a retrospective view of the project and organisation as a whole and a 
comprehension of the experiences throughout my tenure. Principles of project management 
are individually addressed and comparisons drawn between existing benchmarks and 
current practice within CERA/RCP. This section is largely reflective of my perceptions of 
performance. It is important to note my inexperience in project management, besides the 
academic exposure gained throughout the MEM. Despite these limits, it is anticipated that 
RCP and CERA alike will consider this deliberation for future recruitment purposes. 
“Through exposure in a functioning project management office, observe the technical and 
strategic systems in place for project deliverance. Based on these observations and the 
unique position as an independent reviewer of PM practice, develop a set of 
recommendations to improve current practice.” 
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PART A: INITIATED IMPROVEMENTS 
2.1     PROGRESSION SUMMARY 
 
In accordance with the measurables specified in the Project Mandate, regular progress reporting 
was to be made available on a consistent basis, where consequential improvements had been made. 
The brief drafted by the Sponsor prior to project commencement was broad, and allowed for a large 
degree of flexibility and self directive work on my behalf. This stressed the importance of 
establishing direction early on, such that the limited time available was not wasted. As a result, 
progress reports were produced every two weeks to quickly refine the direction of the project. 
Throughout the months of November and December, as the project gained traction and consistency 
on development of the retaining walls model, reporting was completed less frequently. Progress 
reports were submitted to my Supervisor, Piet Beukman for review and feedback and also to project 
leads Brenden Winder & Mike Jeffery. This proved a useful learning experience, enforcing 
accountability and a chance for review and summarised consolidation of completed tasks. The array 
of progress reports completed prior to the Christmas/new year holiday period is provided in the 
supplementary appendices. An explanation of these reports is provided henceforth. 
 
2.1.1    WEEK 1-2 
This report summarises the key issues from internal CERA documents reviewed throughout the first 
two weeks, notably the Business Case and the Draft Port Hills Land Clearance Brief (23 September), 
in conjunction with the Zoning Review Advisory Group Report. Here it was established that the 
constraint of zoning review is outside the scope of my influence and little could be achieved in 
making amendments. It was noted that mapping of properties in debate over zoning could be used 
to form access, clustering and sequencing plans irrespective of the final zoning decision. Further 
progress here was shelved, in favour of constraints non-political in nature, as suggested in the MEM 
Project Guidelines.  
Secondly, demolition legislation was suggested as a possible area of investigation, to determine the 
extent to which current practice is in compliance with environmental practice. Soon after this was 
reported, Luke Austin of LADRA Environmental Consultants returned from holiday to the Operations 
Team. Luke currently provides environmental engineering advice to CERA, in particular to the 
clearances of CBD properties. To me it appeared imparting my resources toward this constraint 
would be fruitless as Luke is an expert in the field and my time would be wiser spent undertaking an 
area of investigation where I have a competitive advantage.  
Insurance settlement forecasting was suggested in this initial report to determine if there was a 
noticeable trend in the time taken to settle each particular red zone classification (Option 1 Total 
Loss, Option 1 Repair, Option 2 Total Loss, and Option 2 Repair). From attending and observing 
weekly Port Hills meetings in the weeks following this report, it was evident that properties in the 
settlement process were managed by Portfolio Manager, Matt Bradley. Due to the complex nature 
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of some properties, properties are treated on a case by case basis such that forecasting is not 
required. In hindsight it may have been beneficial to work alongside Matt more closely and help 
develop such a forecasting method, to simplify his management of the Crown properties and to 
provide indications of upcoming settlements – a useful tool for planning Operations forward 
workload.  
My initial appraisal of retaining walls related issues was that damage assessments should be 
minimised, due to the cost intensity. This would be achieved through establishing ownership of walls 
and completing Crown walls only, or through completing all walls and reaching a cost sharing 
agreement with walls owned by other parties (notably CCC). A framework for the ownership of walls 
has still not been reached by Policy/Legal Teams (at the time of writing of this report), thus cost 
sharing arrangements are still far on the horizon. Secondly, I raised the issue of the need to repair 
walls which are on land or support roads which may be completely cleared in the future. The debate 
surrounding final land usage has not been finalised and clearly it has cost budgeting implications in 
the planning of what works are definitely required. Both these suggestions for improvement have 
obvious barriers outside my influence of control. 
My final suggestion from this progress report was of an academic nature, whereby I challenged how 
the 1/10,000 annual fatality risk probability upper limit was derived. This figure is fundamental to 
the computational modelling of acceptable geotechnical risk on the Port Hills and subsequently the 
basis in zoning of all properties. Analysis of GNS Reports suggested there was scientific reason 
behind this purportedly arbitrary figure.  
 
2.1.2     WEEK 3-4 
In this report I speculated that it would be more cost effective to simply complete clearances 
suspected as being ‘dirty demolition’ (containing hazardous materials) as a site wide dirty 
demolition, as opposed to the time consuming task of isolation and separation of hazardous 
materials once a demolition is underway. This was an ‘economies of scale’ type proposition where it 
may in fact be quicker to complete the dirty demolition, using larger excavators and less on site 
equipment, in a more timely manner, thus reducing the overall clearance cost. The only effective 
way to determine this would be through a pilot study of properties, of which there was none 
planned. Analysis of the costing of the previously completed properties provided no benchmark for 
cost comparison of the two approaches or alternatively no quotes of the different methods were 
available.  
Empirical studies of demolitions are time consuming and expensive and cannot in most cases be 
replicated in a controlled environment. As a result, demolition in comparison to construction is a 
poorly understood field of engineering, whereby cost effectiveness is made possible with sound 
tendering procedures and greater competition amongst contractors (Victoria University, 2003).   
Further progress on retaining walls highlighted two possibilities for cost estimation of repairs: 
1) Obtain data sharing agreements with SCIRT to apply typical repair costs in their scope of 
works to similar walls in the CERA owned walls. Here the limitation determined in 
discussions with Mike Jeffery & Brenden Winder was that the profile of walls and the repair 
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methods in the SCIRT programme of works would likely differ to those encountered on 
residential properties. Contrary to this, I maintain that significant value could be created 
from obtaining and summarising SCIRT retaining wall repair costs as the data set of SCIRT 
walls would be large enough to find similarities between SCIRT walls and walls which the 
Crown will eventually own. 
 
2) Complete a pilot study of a sample of Port Hills retaining wall repairs, involving both simple 
and complex repairs. In hindsight, this suggestion appears inefficient, due to the 
requirement for multiple properties.  A more appropriate approach could be to select just 
one property available for clearance, with a range of different wall types in various 
conditions, to provide a representative sample. The possibility of implementing this is far 
greater if merely one property is involved in the study, as opposed to a range of properties. 
The costs of the repairs of each individual wall should be compared to the damage 
assessment score of the wall (as completed using the model explained in Section 2.1.4).   
 
I hypothesise there will be a high correlation between cost and damage score, as the model 
has proven effective at assessing the condition of groups of walls on a property. Should this 
be the case, CERA will be able to derive cost clarity for retaining wall repair, simply through 
use of the damage assessment model. The confidence interval, X for cost clarity (ie. Repair 
cost +/-  X%) could be derived from the aforementioned correlation between cost and 
damage score. Although this type of analysis becomes rather mathematical, it would be a 
simple task for CERA/Aurecon Engineers and the benefits of cost estimation are far reaching. 
 
2.1.3     WEEK 4-6 
Following discussion with Brenden Winder, it became apparent for the need to approach the issue of 
retaining walls in an integrated approach, incorporating the resources of Policy (Katrinka Good & 
Co), Legal (Susan Newell) and Horizontal Infrastructure (Rob Rouse). An interim Retaining Walls 
Discussion Group was formed, with the aim of removing barriers of the conflicting interests within 
each internal department. Following this initial group formation and ensuing discussion, it was 
obvious that there were far more questions than answers, both technical and legal in nature. I began 
the task of brainstorming all retaining wall matters that may be relevant to all teams of the Retaining 
Walls Discussion Group. It is important to note my experience is in technical matters, thus there is a 
fairly obvious inclination in favour of an Operations driven approach. This was summarised in the 
progress report, the results of which are further summarised below. 
The following three questions must be answered: 
1) All factors considered, is remediation of a given wall required? 
2) What is the most cost effective way of doing so? 
3) How will remediation be coordinated? 
Referring to Appendix Section A1.1.3 I collated all information relating to each of these questions. 




Table 1: Summary of information requirements to answer three fundamental questions 
Fundamental Question 
Number 
Required Information Primary Responsibility 
Possible Support 
From 
1 Existing info Operations  
1 Ownership Legal Operations, Policy 





1 Access Operations Legal 
1 Future use Policy  
1 Health & Safety Operations  
1 Prioritisation Policy Operations 
2 Cost estimates Operations  
2 Weighting system Operations  
2 Insurance Insurance  
3 Contractor availability Operations Policy 
3 Engineering availability Operations Policy 
3 Sequencing Operations Policy 
 
In the weeks following this progress report, through the development of a computer model of 
retaining walls it was evident that Operations has a great emphasis on safety as the primary factor in 
their approach. With this in mind, perhaps question 2 should be refined to “What is the most 
appropriate approach to mitigating damaged walls, considering safety first and other factors next?” 
This requires further discussion as there is still no definitive quantitative ranking of factors which the 
project uses for decision making purposes. However, it must be stressed that Health & Safety is a 
legal requirement which must always be managed, where understanding the risk profile is the key. 
I concluded this progress report by stating that the issues surrounding retaining walls are 
multidimensional, where a ‘one size fits all’ Policy approach would be difficult. Whilst attempting to 
categorise and generalise the walls may be possible for policy drafting purposes, in reality many of 
the questions which are unable to be answered will required a discretionary approach. Engineering 
judgement on a case by case allows for this, whereby asserting decisions and recommendations on 
each individual walls merit would be a more efficient approach.  
 
2.1.4     WEEK 7-9 
The primary focus throughout these three weeks was the development of a preliminary summary 
model based on any assessments currently completed on retaining walls. Furthermore, it was agreed 
upon by the Retaining Walls Discussion Group that the Kinsey Terrace/Clifton Terrace cluster of 
properties is the most heavily damaged and development of a retaining walls model should begin 
here. The data available on retaining walls in this study was sourced from the Aurecon Retaining 
Wall Assessment Report – Clifton/Kinsey Terrace Cluster, commissioned for CERA. A sample of this 
retaining wall data is shown in Appendix Section A2.1. The correspondence between CERA and 
Aurecon Engineers in scoping this work is presented in Appendix Section A2.2.  
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Initially my approach to forming the model was to read the entire report produced by Aurecon to 
gain an understanding of the typical issues surrounding retaining walls. This also allowed me to 
determine what information in the report would be useful and how it could be manipulated and 
summarised. Appendix Section A2.3, Tables 4, 5 shows the information which was able to be 
extracted from the report and this is explained as follows: 
 WALL TYPE 
 There were 10+ different wall types described in the Assessment Report. For 
simplicity I divided these into 6 categories; Masonry, Stacked Stone, In-Situ 
Concrete, Timber King Post, Concrete Crib and other/unknown.  
 
 DAMAGE 
 This was broken down into major, minor, none and unknown. This was largely a 
judgement call on my behalf from an interpretation of the description in the 
relevant notes for demolition methodology. 
 
 RISK TO LIFE/PROPERTY 




 “Yes/no”. This was an interpretation on my behalf, from the information given in 
“what is wall supporting above (within 1x height)” and “what is at base and in 
support of wall (within 1x height)”.  Walls supporting critical infrastructure such as 
roads or other walls or critical property were assigned “yes”. 
 
 HEIGHT 
 Any wall greater than 1.5 metres at any point along its length was assigned “yes”.  
 
 SHORT TERM ACTION 
 A demolition recommendation is given in the report. A large number of walls have 
an unknown possible action plan. 
 
 LONG TERM ACTION 
 This was left as void. It was decided that the long term action is dependent on final 
land use which was unknown at the time.  
 
On review of the summarised data, it occurred that there may be correlations within the data which 
is contributing to damage. I hypothesised that the wall damage would be affected by the wall type 
and to a lesser degree, wall height. Tables 6 & 7 show the analysis which suggests otherwise that 
there is no apparent correlation between wall height/type and damage, as the percentage damaged 
in each category do not deviate from the benchmarks from all walls as a whole. Important to note 
was that the hypothesised larger degree of minor damage in masonry and in-situ concrete walls was 
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confirmed. This is due to the mode of damage (cracking/fracturing) being easy to detect. Lastly, as a 
result of the hypothesis that wall height and damage would be correlated, analysis was performed to 
determine if wall height and type is correlated (are larger walls constructed in a similar manner?). 
This proved the null hypothesis correct, as shown in Appendix Table 8.  
The summarised data shows the following information: 
 Masonry and stacked stone walls account for 62% of the total, while in situ concrete 
and timber crib walls account for 14% and 13% respectively. 
 Approximately half are majorly damaged. Another quarter have minor damage. The 
number of walls with unknown damage is 22%. 
 42% of properties have a risk to life or property. 2% are unknown. 
 The split of walls supporting other infrastructure (dependency) is approximately 50-
50. Similarly for the walls greater than 1.5 metres.  
 There are a large number of walls with an unknown short term action (59%). 38% of 
walls are recommended to be removed, while there are only 4% suggested for 
repair.  
In ruling out correlations within the data, hence eliminating the possibility of flagging certain walls 
for criticality by category or type an alternative approach was required.  
 
2.1.5     WEEK 10-13 
Appendix Tables 9, 10, 11 & 12 show the excel model developed from the initial version explained in 
weeks 7-9. For presentation purposes, this spreadsheet is broken down into 4 tables.  
Version 2 of the model makes the following adjustments: 
 All factors which may contribute negatively to a given retaining wall and its possible 
remediation will be incorporated. 
 As a result of discussions with Policy and Legal, it seemed beneficial to incorporate 
boundary issues into the model. Walls potentially crossing multiple boundaries, or 
having legal ownership issues may pose troublesome for clearances.  
 From a desk study, the location of known retaining walls within the Kinsey/Clifton 
cluster were analysed, with walls classified as follows; green zone boundary, red zone 
boundary, sharing a boundary with infrastructure (eg. CCC roads) or no boundary (wall 
is not close to the section boundaries).  
 The total wall size (area) was incorporated into the model, as opposed to the wall 
height, which is non-correlated and does not serve purpose. Wall size will ultimately 
be a driver of cost.  
 The incorporated inputs, which may be altered. The inputs are the weighting factors 
which are assigned to each category (eg. Size, damage, dependency etc). The total 
score for a wall is the sum of each of the weighting factors related to the wall. An 
example is shown in Appendix Table 13. 
 Upon the request of Policy, the walls scores are broken down into a continuum of 6 
categories. The worst affected wall is normalised to a score of six, while the least 
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affected wall is normalised to a score of zero. All other walls final scores were 
normalised pro rata between 0.00 – 6.00. 
 An output graph of the number of each wall falling within scoring categories 0.00-
1.00, 1.01-2.00, 2.01-3.00, 3.01-4.00, 4.01-5.00, 5.01-6.00. This was useful for 
determining how the distribution changed with selection of the input weighting 
factors. For Policy Teams purposes, it was also useful for displaying a final summary of 
the distribution of all walls in a cluster. An example is shown in Appendix Table 14. 
 The profile of the property was incorporated (whether it is high profile section, viewed 
from a major arterial road). This was achieved using Google Maps. 
2.2     FUTURE MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
As it stands, the current model is useful as a method of assessing large numbers of retaining walls 
such that the most critical may be identified. The suggested future developments to be applied to 
the model are: 
 Finalise the input weighting factors. As it stands, these consist of arbitrary educated guessing 
by myself. The weighting factor for safety/life risk is the highest, however the relative 
weights of all remaining inputs have no justification or reasoning in their selection. Before 
the New Year’s holiday period I stressed the importance of this – any model is only as good 
as the quality of inputs. Again, I will stress the fact that from within the Retaining Walls 
Discussion Group these inputs need to be finalised by Policy. 
 Attempts should be made to include the likely insurance on a wall. This is a process of 
assigning wall ownership to a particular property and then assigning the properties 
insurance to the walls on that property. Ultimately, insurance apportionment will subsidise 
the cost to some of the walls. The insurance coverage specifically to retaining walls is 
provided in Appendix Table 15.  
 Likely mitigation cost could be incorporated into the model. The cost would be a function of 
the wall size, wall type, accessibility etc. This could be gained from a rough estimate by the 
engineers at the time of assessment. Although the accuracy here for individual walls is 
limited, when averaged out to tens of walls on a property, or hundreds of walls in a cluster, 
the errors are proportionally reduced.  
2.3     FUTURE MODEL INCORPORATION  
 
The current model utilises information from the Wall Assessment Report – Clifton/Kinsey Terrace 
Cluster. The information gained in this report would need to be applied to other walls for the model 
to be of any use in a system wide approach. Whether assessing the walls in this manner is cost 
effective is outside the scope of this report. There may be other approaches to modelling the 
criticality and identification of large numbers of walls, however this assessing and reporting format 
provides a useful benchmark.  
10 
 
2.4     MODEL LIMITATIONS 
 
This model has several limitations, as explained below: 
 The model has been developed using primarily a desk study approach. Although I have 
gained exposure to some of the technical issues from on-site work, this has been in a limited 
capacity. There are safety implications of undertaking work on geotechnically unstable land, 
especially in the Kinsey/Clifton Terrace cluster, making it difficult to progress on site without 
CERA Geotechnical Engineers present. Having accompanying Engineers on site with me 
would be a demand on already stretched resources. The desk study approach makes it 
difficult to make improvements and spot trends based on on-site observations. 
 The model has not explicitly been verified as valid to on-site observations. This being the 
case, Brenden Winder has expressed verbally that the conclusions made by the model as to 
which properties are worst affected in the Kinsey/Clifton Cluster, are correct. Verifying the 
model is a simple task of comparing it to a representative range of walls on site. 
 The model is best suited to assessing groups of retaining walls in a cluster or on a property. 
Using this model for a single wall exposes errors made when qualitatively evaluating the 
damage assessment reports. It is difficult to turn qualitative descriptions of assessment 
reports in to quantitative data and thus errors will be imminent. Using this model to assess 
groups of walls however provides a good indication as the greater sample size reduces the 
effect of such inaccuracies. 
2.5     CONCLUSIONS 
 
The self directive working style to investigating improvement strategies for the Port Hills Land 
Clearance Programme has delivered a number of alternative approaches. In the initial weeks of the 
project, I independently reached many of the constraints which the project faced which I attempted 
to challenge. These constraints fell under three categories; constraints outside my ability to 
influence, constraints which already had suitable resource allocation to mitigating them, or 
constraints which had minimal resource allocation to mitigation. My work on constraints in this final 
category (retaining wall related issues) concludes the following: 
The initial month of the project was met with multiple dead ends as the constraints were identified. 
Most of these constraints were unable to be managed and focus was instead directed to those 
where valuable progress could be achieved. This provided a useful crash course into all aspects of 
the project and ensured that the main area of focus was one in which further resource allocation 
was required. Becoming the “go to guy” on retaining walls issues was an interesting result of this, 
whereby the PHLCP was after a clear all system wide integrated approach to solving the problem. 
Qualitative data may be turned into quantitative data through careful manipulation and well stated 
assumptions. The retaining walls modelling exercise provides a useful example as to how unknowns 
or gaps in information can still be accounted for in a quantitative approach whereby assumptions 
are clearly expressed and maintained consistent throughout. 
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There is a need for an analytical modelling type approach for categorising retaining walls as the 
quantity of walls is such that following a procedural approach aids in simplification. The Port Hills red 
zoned properties contain an unknown quantity of retaining walls, but based on current work 
undertaken, there could be up to 5,000 walls ultimately included in the PHLCP scope of works. This 
represents a significant opportunity for work to be completed in an analytical approach for 
identifying the most groups of walls, properties or clusters. This is in contrast to the inefficiencies 
likely to be encountered through approaching and devising a plan for each wall based on individual 
merit and engineering judgement.  
Analytical methods have largely been overlooked on clearances thus far, due to the lack of combined 
complexities. Furthermore, it is important to note that once analytical procedures are implemented 
and verified through on site observations, there is a low reliance on altering and adjusting the 
model. The work completed as part of the MEM should form a sound basis for an approach on how 





















PART B: NON INITIATED IMPROVEMENTS  
3.1     SAFETY 
 
Construction and demolition is often considered as an industry that has larger fatality and serious 
injury rates, where unfortunately, many of these work related incidents could have been prevented. 
Sub-standard safety practice and injury are highly correlated (as well as costs of injuries), thus it is a 
necessity to promote safe construction practice. In the wake of the February Earthquakes, the 
importance of safety is the highest priority, to prevent further fatality.  
Safety management practice (SMP) consists of a number of different methods, which fall under 
three categories; information, process and committees. As safety management is vital to 
construction projects, studies have been performed to gain views from industry personnel as to their 
perception of which SMP’s are important on a project and contributing to project performance. One 
such empirical study based in Hong Kong, from 232 notable construction practioner respondents 
concluded the following (Cheng, 2012): 
 Safety management process was perceived as the most important, followed by safety 
management information and committees.  
 Through hierarchal regression analysis Information and committees are most important to 
project performance. 
 The construction and demolition industry has paid less attention to safety management 
committees.  
The results of this study form the broad basis of a new age of SMP thinking in construction, however 
due to the nature of the industry, are poorly understood or publicised. Further studies confirm these 
principles such as “Factors influencing the implementation of a safety management system for 
construction sites” (Ismail, 2012).  For the Port Hills Land Clearance Programme, these conclusions 
have the following relevance: 
 For Contractors, over emphasizing the safety process (in the form of methodology review) 
may be inefficient. Instead a more effective approach would be to ensure a timely flow of 
accurate on-site information between CERA and the Contractor and the development of 
regular safety meetings between all contractors and CERA Operations Staff. This will allow 
for immediate feedback not just between CERA-Contractor, but also between Contractor-
Contractor. These techniques have been used by RCP in the CBD, a factor in the zero 
fatalities. As a result these were further implemented on the flat lands clearances.  
 CERA needs to stress the importance to Contractors before and during the contract of the 
need to communicate concerns or raise important safety related issues, under any 
circumstances. This is in alignment with the well known NASA culture whereby any team 
member was encouraged to raise concerns about conditions that prevent them from 
working safely and effectively (e.g., poor work methods, unsafe work conditions, lack of 
safety measures and equipment) without fear of consequence (NASA, 2004). 
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3.2     RISK MANAGEMENT CAPABILITIES OF CONTRACTORS  
 
Projects can be plagued with a variety of risks at any stage in the projects life cycle, whereby risk is 
defined as an uncertain event which may affect any one of the projects critical success factors. In the 
case of the Port Hills Land Clearance Project, the catalogue of risks is overwhelming and the ability to 
manage them will determine the success of the project. It is in the best interests of CERA and the 
project’s deliverance to select contractors with a greater ability to manage risk. 
“Risk management capability (RMC) reflects the sophistication of an organization's understanding of 
its risk portfolio and how to manage those risks. Contractor’s with diverse RMC can reduce risk in 
different levels” (Mu, 2013). An assessment of the current state of RMC allows for analysis of the 
weaknesses and strengths of the Contractor to sustainably manage risk and their ability to control 
risks and deliver performance on current or future contracts (clearance clusters or properties). 
Literature commonly suggests questionnaires as a suitable form of analysis, however, Contractors 
looking to ‘game the system’ will quickly see through this. Incorporating questionnaires into the 
tendering process must be complemented with examples and testimony of such RMC from past 
completed projects. The following six factors should be assessed in the RMC assessment process, 
whether it is through verbal meetings, tendering questionnaires, testimony or a combination of all 
methods. Further elaboration of these factors is provided in Appendix Section A3.1 and an 
alternative set of factors is also provided in Appendix Section A3.2 (Wang, 2011) 
 Factor 1: RM attitude 
 Factor 2: RM culture 
 Factor 3: Risk identification capability 
 Factor 4: Risk analysis capability 
 Factor 5: Risk response capability 
 Factor 6: Development and application of a standardized RM process 
3.3     ASSESSING CONTRACTORS PERFORMANCE 
 
Similarly to RMC assessment, analysis of the actual performance of a Contractor should be routinely 
performed, to ensure accountability and verify that delivery is of a standard implied at the award of 
contract. Here this is broken down into five main considerations of performance, which further 
elaboration is provided for in Appendix Section A3.3 (Sawhney, 2011) 
 ‘Soundness’ of business and workforce 
 Planning & Control 
 Quality Performance 
 Past Performance 
 Overall Project Success 
It is important to note that the likely limited availability of Contractors able to meet tendering pre-
qualification and hence complete projects has implications for CERA. The project cost will increase if 
Contractors with poor performance are removed as the remaining Contractors have “purchasing 
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power”. On the Port Hills it may be a case of balancing performance and quality with competition 
between contractors. 
3.4     ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT & INFLATIONARY CONTRACTOR PRICING 
 
The effect of inflation on a local economy immediately after an extreme natural event is well 
understood. Although extreme cases of inflation are usually isolated to developing countries, in the 
immediate aftermath, developed economies are also likely to suffer supply disruptions and resource 
shortages in post disaster reconstruction (Seville, 2011).  
In the case of the Port Hills land Clearance Project, there are serious risks in lack of availability for 
qualified engineering expertise (in particular structural and geotechnical engineers). This shortfall is 
likely to be faced by CERA Operations and also the Contractors. Engineering availability is required 
by Contractors in completing demolition methodologies for tendering (requires understanding of 
geotechnical, structural, environmental, traffic management, infrastructure and sequencing 
requirements etc) as well as continual on site monitoring during the demolition and sign off phase. 
Conversely, engineering availability is required by CERA to review and assess tendering documents 
as well as overseeing the on-site works of the Contractor.  
The 2008 Wenchuan China Earthquakes highlighted the misconception of the Public that the 
Government is the most significant institution the nation could utilise in dealing with the 
earthquakes (Wilkinson, 2010). On site observations further confirmed this. In spite of resourcing 
facilitation efforts made by the Chinese government, the local Contractors and reconstruction 
organisations in the earthquake affected areas appeared to be less proactive in the reconstruction 
resource procurement. This situation is congruent with similar post disaster recovery efforts in the 
UK and Indonesia (Bosher, 2007), where except for a few large national construction businesses, 
there were no contingency plans in place for smaller construction firms toward skilled engineering 
resource.  
As the central agency in earthquake recovery in Christchurch, CERA should note the following: 
 Smaller contractors may face this particular threat whereby they do not have the purchasing 
power or ability to recruit and maintain the engineering experience required to tender for 
clearance contracts. 
 This may leave CERA exposed to only a handful of Contractors able to complete clearances. 
 Less competition could affect the delivery of the project in terms of greater costs, 
Contractors pressured to cut corners, lower handover quality and timeliness of completion.  
 Smaller Contractors should be notified sooner rather than later of the need to have access to 




3.5     DECONSTRUCTION VS DEMOLITION  
 
The ‘last in first out’ process of selective dismantling (deconstruction), is one in which building 
components are dismantled in the reverse order to original construction (McLendon, 2000). There 
are potential cost and time ramifications in the decision to adopt either approach. An economic 
appraisal of the cost effectiveness of deconstruction versus demolition on the Port Hills is not 
possible in the limited timeframe of this project, however literature review and compilation of the 
key considerations is possible. These are summarised below (Inglis, 2007) (Denhart, 2010) (Dantata, 
2005) (Gjerde, 2003) (Victoria University, 2003) 
Table 2: Comparison of deconstruction to demolition 
BENEFITS TO DECONSTRUCTION BARRIERS TO DECONSTRUCTION 
ENVIRONMENTAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Reduced primary resource use NZ’s small, dispersed population and geographic 
isolation inhibits market growth 
Reduced waste to landfill The high cost of transport and storage of 
recycled components and materials 
Increased opportunities for recycling Guaranteed quality/quantities of reused 
materials are difficult 
Site impacts such as dust reduced The high cost of transport and storage of 
recycled components and materials 
ECONOMIC ECONOMIC 
On sale salvage and reduced landfill costs Low cost of some new raw materials 
Local market opportunities for recycling industry The tightening up of Health and Safety legislation 
SOCIAL Deconstruction needs a more skilled workforce 
than demolition 
Deconstruction creates more jobs Market pressures - the current climate of ‘as fast 
as possible’ 
Deconstruction trains workers for construction Construction & Demolition Industry 
Provides low cost materials to low income 
communities 
Unregulated industry in C&D 
Contributes to Local Authority and Central 
Government waste and energy efficiency targets 
Financial benefits of deconstruction over 
demolition are not understood 
OTHER ISSUES 
Legal liability not clear 
Confusion surrounding legislation 
Lack of technical documentation on buildings 
 
Further considerations for CERA if deconstruction methods are investigated further: 
Adding waste minimisation requirements at the tender stage can have a large impact with little if 
any increase in costs. This is primarily due to it still being a competitive process. Requiring waste 
minimisation techniques via contracts also builds capacity within demolition companies. This can 
then be translated to other building sites as a precedent. 
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The most common cost experienced in waste minimisation is lost time. Setting up new systems and 
communicating them to staff all take time and effort. This is often the first barrier to implementing 
waste minimisation.  
Ward Demolition NZ completes residential deconstruction projects with up to 95% recovery (by 
weight). Recovering even a fraction of this figure could greatly increase the cost effectiveness. Cost 
benefit analysis could be researched further, to determine the break-even point in recovery 
percentage, whereby the process of deconstruction typically becomes more cost effective than 
demolition.  
There is a significant opportunity for on-site reuse. eg. Using on-site crushed concrete as backfill for 
retaining walls instead of importing fill. Excessive on-site fill is advantageous and has the potential 
for great savings where retaining walls are simply buried or the surrounding land gradient reduced 
to enhance slope stability characteristics. 
A dedicated centralised source separation facility for either the entire project or each individual 
cluster could be considered. Source separation is easier and more cost effective than sorting 
conglomerates of materials. Here the drawback is that potential locations for such a facility may be 
difficult to find. The PHLCP faced difficulty securing a small on-site site office and it is assumed that 
there would be a greater level of difficulty in sourcing and securing a suitable source separation 
facility. 
3.6     DISASTER RECOVERY MODEL AND ADAPTIONS FOR CURRENT 
SCENARIO 
 
The final insights of Part B are related to comparison of the established disaster recovery model to 
the framework adopted by CERA. The model below, developed in 2013, encapsulates much of the 
prior academic thought surrounding disaster planning strategy for project managers. It is in 
alignment with the Project Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK) perspectives (left column), 
whilst also incorporating the feedback and amendments made by a panel of 37 Project Managers 
with involvement in disaster recovery.  
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Figure 1: Currently accepted disaster recovery model by PMBOK (Anthopoulos, 2013) 
 
Academic amendments to the model as observed throughout my time involved with the rebuild at 
CERA would incorporate many specifics.  
 Attempting to account for or some recognition of behavioural management in the 
communication stage would be beneficial. Accounting for the volatility of the immediate 
aftermath is paramount for the effective response and allocation of resources. This period of 
volatility may remain throughout the whole process.  
 
 Including stages to account for inactive threats or threats which do not eventuate. 
 
 There is a necessity to incorporate an ethical and legal perspective which factors in the 
disasters consequences and implications to human livelihood. This is particularly relevant in 
the case of displaced residents and compulsorily acquired property, which is often not a 
factor in many disaster recoveries. Furthermore, this would complement the safety 
management and claim management aspects of the PMBOK. 
Although this framework may appear abstract, contextual and difficult to implement in the current 
program of works, the value should not be overlooked. The model in Figure 1 is a contextual model 
which has been adapted to incorporate feedback from a representative sample of project managers 
exposed to the same challenges as the PHLCP. Often industry feedback or verification is overlooked 
in academic literature and this framework was the most relevant that could be sourced 
incorporating both a contextual and operational approach. Furthermore it is important to note that 
such contextual models are rarely revisited when challenges arise in the field, however their 
inclusion as a reference tool provides evidence that their implications have been considered. 
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PART C: PROJECT INSIGHTS 
4.1     PROJECT LIFE CYCLE 
 
With limited experience in project management, beyond an academic focus throughout the MEM 
course, providing an evaluation of the practices implemented throughout the Port Hills Land 
Clearance Project (PHLCP) is constrained. With this in mind, the knowledge set of PMBOK, in 
reference to the document “Tips for new project managers” is applied to provide an evaluation 
between current CERA project management practices and the established fundamentals of project 
management. In deliberating on these comparisons, the stage of the project life cycle mentioned 
below must not be neglected in recognition of the time available to remedy potential shortfalls.  
The observations mentioned in Sections 4.2 – 4.11 must make recognition of the current stage of the 
project life cycle. The reference Tips for new project managers assumes the project is in its initial 
phase of progression, where in reality the time I have spent on the PHLCP Project has been 
throughout a combination of the start of the project through to carrying out the work. These stages 
are portrayed in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2: The project life cycle  
 
4.2     TERMS OF REFERENCE 
 
Developing the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Project Manager and the Team is important such 
that everyone on the job has a clear understanding of their job responsibilities. The goal of a TOR is 
to avoid differences between what team members perceive as their responsibilities (not just their 
role) and also of the responsibilities of the Project Manager.  
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“...pay particular attention to their role in defining key project inputs or reviewing project outputs, 
specifications, documents, deliverables, or anything else. You should try as far as possible to get what 
we call input oriented comments, rather than comments after a development activity” 
Here, the PHLCP Project Management performs accordingly. Within the first day of undertaking the 
project, I was circulated the document “CERA – Port Hills Clearance - Project Responsibilities”. This 
document outlines the exact description of the TOR explained above, outlining each role, its 
functions as well as other relevant supporting documents and key relationships between roles which 
may be important. There is a greater sense of accountability with each team members 
responsibilities stated, as opposed to disclosing the roles to just the relevant individuals.  
4.3     MANAGING STAKEHOLDERS 
 
“Where necessary bring challenging discussions to the front-end of the project” 
Identifying and managing stakeholders has been performed to a high standard throughout my 
oversight of the project. Formally identifying and recognising the stakeholders has been practiced 
from the start through the PHLCP Brief the Business Case and furthermore through the Port Hills 
Project Info, which gives specific contact details of notable stakeholders and other relevant 
information. In a project closely under the spotlight of media scrutiny, the list of stakeholders is 
immense and has the potential to culminate interest groups from the entire city of Christchurch. 
Management of stakeholders is one of the highest priorities to the success of the PHLCP and in my 
opinion, in conjunction with the Communications team at CERA, Operations has performed well in 
this regard. The Port Hills Team has gone beyond expectations to incorporate community groups 
such as the Christchurch Retaining Walls Group. Although such community groups may have little 
bearing on the success of the PHLCP, Port Hills Project Management has gone beyond the call of 
duty to align with the overarching CERA strategic vision of recovery of greater Christchurch.  
4.4     GOALS & OBJECTIVES 
 
“There is much written about deliverables on projects, however, much less is written about defining, 
categorically clearly, the goal, objectives and expected outcomes of a project” 
Broadly speaking, the key objectives as stated in the PHLCP Project Brief are; clearance, safety, 
coordination, minimised disruption and cost effectiveness. Exact refinement of these objectives has 
not formally been developed, nor has the timeframes of these deliverables been stated, however a 
broad four stage delivery process has been proposed. Much of these inadequacies are out of the 
control of the PHLCP Project Management, whereby decisions such as final land use, budgets and full 
scope of works are yet to be confirmed. These inadequacies and gaps in information are well 
accounted for through stating key dependencies and linkages within objectives reporting in the 
PHLCP Project Brief. It may be beneficial to the project to iteratively update the Project Brief of these 
shortcomings as information is made available and have the information circulated. I found there 
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was good verbal communication of such updates in weekly Port Hills meetings, however formal 
recognition of such was lacking.  
4.5     PROJECT DELIVERY STRATEGY 
 
“This is HOW the project deliverables and outcome will be defined and delivered” 
SOP’s for quality delivery have been drafted and presented to all team members. This is a document 
which based on the feedback and review from the operational phase of the clearances should be 
iteratively updated and amended. Thus far, a small number of trial clearances have already reached 
final sign-off stage and the best practice learnt from such clearances can be used to update draft 
versions of the SOP. Useful progress has been made towards the process of sequencing through 
Gantt Chart Templates of the programme of works for individual sites. On the global scale, 
Demolition Planning Packs for the most difficult cluster – Clifton/Kinsey Terrace have been produced 
by Aurecon Consultants. Valuable progress is constantly being achieved in refining the delivery 
strategy, of which the Port Hills Team will have a firm grasp on when the project gains greater 
momentum throughout mid 2014. It may be beneficial to the project for Aurecon Demolition 
Planning Reports to exercise a greater level of brevity, bearing in mind the ability of Demolition 
Contractors to effectively absorb and comprehend reports several hundred pages long. 
4.6     RISKS  
 
“Risk management must be done in the definition stages of the project - we can't define, plan and 
launch a project and then start to give serious attention to risk” 
PHLCP Project Management has made effective attempts at developing a risk matrix, considering the 
risk, impacts, likelihood, risk rating and control measures. Again faults cannot be drawn at the 
approach undertaken here, where risk management on the Port Hills, in particular that of safety is of 
the highest priority. Contrary to the above statement, a great majority of the risks in the project 
have been identified throughout the project. This is to be expected as the scope of the project is 
progressively realised. The allocation of personal responsibility for certain risks in the risk register is 
a novel approach, infrequently suggested within literature. Frequent mention of updated risks within 
weekly meetings, as well forecasting tools such as Aurecon Weather Reports indicate the project has 
a strong handle on risk management. Furthermore, continual education of risks such as attending 
fire management and asbestos H&S conferences ensures industry best practice is maintained. The 
risk profiling will be put to the test throughout the coming year when the clearance rate increases. 
PHLCP should take particular care to determine the appropriate balance between managing risks 




4.7     COMMUNICATION 
 
“It is often said that communication is the lifeblood of and one of the biggest challenges on projects” 
Although the majority of this project has been undertaken in a limited on-site capacity, with a 
relatively low dependence on feedback and communication, observations can be drawn. CERA 
Operations should pay particular care in its approach to dealing with residents and affected parties 
in the most tactful manner possible. It would be prudent for the Port Hills Team to continually 
reinforce the necessity not to neglect conducting itself in the most sensitive manner possible whilst 
on-site. Furthermore, the CERA Operations Team may be well advised to consider the amount of 
‘face-to-face’ communication utilised. Passive forms of conversation such as email can be 
attributable to significant project delays and misinterpreted messages. An over-reliance on email 
should be avoided, where a greater on-site presence (especially in the case of active demolitions) 
may be more appropriate in maintaining client-contractor relations.  
4.9     SCOPE CREEP 
 
“Take a good idea and many people will try and add to it all the ideas they've had waiting in the 
wings, many of which will bear no relation to the strategic objectives of the project” 
The PHLCP runs a very high risk of scope creep. This is a combination of two major aspects: 
 The scope of the project is loosely defined in the three main aspects of the project 
management triangle; cost, timeframe and handover quality (effectively final land use). 
 Political motivations beyond the control of PHLCP Project Management. 
Throughout the duration of this project, I have witnessed scope creep in the decision to rezone an 
additional 237 Port Hills properties, resulting in an inflated scope of red zone properties (to 714 
properties). Although this situation was unavoidable and the implications were made well aware to 
Project Management, it does not alter the fact that further allowances must be made. As a result, 
the timeframe deliverable of three years would be considered ambitious, while budgeting 
amendments must be made as well as flow on effects to work sequencing, communications 
planning, contractor engagement etc. This example of major scope creep provides an amplified view 
of the secondary effects which scope creep may induce. In short, even minor scope creep should be 
avoided (where possible) as the resulting sequencing effects to the PHLCP will almost certainly 
instigate further delay.  
On a localised level, within my work on retaining walls, in conjunction with the Policy and Legal 
Teams, I have been privy to scope creep. This was largely the result of little to no mission statement 
or framework surrounding the objectives and scope of the Retaining Walls Discussion Group. Whilst 
the group was still acting in a largely ‘brainstorming’ capacity, often I felt the direction slipping from 
what my intended focus was. For other members, I am sure I was a contributor to this also. For the 
PHLCP these experiences highlight that a clearly defined scope which is interpreted in the same 
manner by all parties is crucial to avoiding misjudgement between the interested parties. This will 
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become particularly important in the development of tendering documents and clearance contracts, 
whereby the consequences of misinterpretation may lead to costly variations to the contract and 
progress delays.  
4.10     PROJECT PROGRESSION 
 
“Know exactly where you are relative to the project plan throughout the project” 
In this regard, PHLCP Project Management performs well. Regular weekly emails informing the team 
of their key areas of focus throughout the week maintains that management and the team are on 
the same wavelength with work progression. In addition, summaries of the entire PHLCP clearances 
progress are particularly useful. Although much of the progress is behind the assumed rate (as 
expected) the summaries of settled properties available for clearance, and currently cleared 
properties are very useful for tracking progress. This work primarily coordinated through Portfolio 
Manager, Matt Bradley should be reported at the beginning of each weekly Port Hills meeting, to 
ensure the entire team, as well as other secondary parties are kept up to date with current progress. 
A standard reporting format which is consistent would also be useful for clarity purposes.  
4.11     ISSUE RESOLUTION 
 
“Decision making on projects can often be one of your biggest challenges – if you’re not in front of 
the curve on this one you could be swamped very quickly during the delivery phase” 
With regards to issue resolution, the PHLCP is in a rare position whereby the ‘organising and 
preparing’ stage of the project’s life cycle has been extended greatly as a result of zoning review. 
This has allowed for the fortuitous position of having ample time to iron out deficiencies in 
methodologies and SOP, whilst still maintaining a small workload of properties available for 
clearance, which act as a trial run for the bulk of the work throughout the delivery phase. PHLCP 
Management should take care not to squander this opportunity and to ensure feedback and 
improvements are implemented from work in progress. The delivery phase of the project is likely to 
be extremely complex, juggling a great deal of known and unknown risks with limited resources. 
Effective planning and issue resolution now will save problems downstream. Furthermore, it is likely 
that implementing change and influencing the direction of the project now will have far greater cost 
and time effectiveness than the same initiatives a year or two into the project. The cost of changes 
and correcting mistakes increase throughout the lifecycle of the project. PHLCP Project Management 





4.12     CONCLUSIONS 
 
The inclusion of this section was intended not to develop innovative ideas for the implementation of 
the project, but to reinforce simple project management practices which are often overlooked by 
the most experienced project managers. Such practices may appear elementary or common sense to 
the layman, however their adoption to the project sooner rather than later may result in 
considerable improvements and avoid potential pitfalls. From a largely review type capacity 
throughout much of this project my thoughts are summarised as follows: 
 For a project with such a large degree of scope uncertainty, Project Management is likely to 
face pressure further down the track in refining the exact deliverables of the project. A 
bottom up approach here should be used to communicate the need for certainty in the 
project.  
 Given the constraints encountered throughout the planning phase of the project, PHLCP 
appears to have a firm grasp of the fundamentals of managing a project and have performed 
well in delegating a complex problem into manageable work streams.  
 The PMBOK provides a useful reference tool in explaining some of the fundamentals of 
project management. While such practices are typically adopted in some form by most 
project managers, it is important to be aware of the contextual manner in which the project 
in being managed.  
While it is important to note my inexperience as a project manager, many of the evaluations and 
suggestions will serve as a useful reminder toward the basics of project management. In the instance 
of disagreement between these observations and the PHLCP’s views on current practice, at the very 













This MEM project served as a useful addition to, and continuation from, the lessons taught in the 
classroom throughout the year.  
The opportunity to apply accepted theories and industry best practice in a real world situation has 
strengthened the value of the MEM course and my enjoyment of it. Working with experienced 
professionals on a project of the scale and complexity of the PHLCP has been a unique experience 
and one for which I am very grateful.  
This gratitude extends to my project supervisor Mike Jeffery and the entire team at RCP. You have all 
been amazing in teaching me the opportunities and constraints that impact your industry. In 
addition you have made the experience so enjoyable by including me as part of the team and 
providing constructive feedback at every stage throughout the project period. 
MEM prides itself on the successful application of theory to industry best practice. The completion 
of this project report has allowed me to combine these two as well as providing the opportunity to 
explore current literature on related topics. Often, professionals in the project management industry 
are under great time pressure, resulting in a lack of time resources to research and apply current 
industry practice. In this regard I feel I have added significant value, reinforcing and confirming many 
of the decision making processes which are currently adopted, but not necessarily understood in a 
contextual manner. I feel that my understanding of the project management industry environment 
has increased dramatically as a result of this.  
The PHLCP faces a large degree of risk, whereby the incidence of fatality or serious injury must be 
avoided at all costs. Management of the project are well aware of this risk and have initiated all 
reasonable processes to control this risk throughout the flat lands and CBD clearances thus far. A 
continuation of these principles and due diligence of the additional geotechnical constraints in the 
Port Hills shall provide that the project continues to mitigate risk in a logical approach.  
This project has provided a diverse exposure to the elements of risk control in project management 
and the principles researched throughout my tenure have supplemented the academic coursework 
learnt throughout 2013. Without the foresight of Mike Jeffery and Matt Allen of RCP in spotting an 
opportunity and an alternative approach to project management, this project would not have been 
possible. Once again I thank you for your consideration of my initial ‘cold call’ and I trust that this 
report meets the high standard which sets RCP apart from its competitors.  
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A0     PROJECT MANDATE 
 
1.0     DOCUMENT OUTLINE 
This document serves the following functions:                                                                                                    
 Formalises the scope of the MEM Project for the clarity of Student (Todd Patterson), 
Supervisor (Piet Beukman, University of Canterbury) and Sponsor (RCP Ltd.) alike, in a 
standardised format, which builds on the initial scope provided in the document “MEM 
Industry Project Scholarship”.  
 Refines the document “MEM Project Charter Version 1.0” to reflect the dynamic nature of 
the MEM Project encountered in the initial month and reflects these changes through 
defining the project in a Mandate form as opposed to a Charter. 
 Forms the basis of the academic requirements of the MEM course work “Project 
Management Assignment”, reinforcing industry best practice in the administrative reporting 
whilst undertaking a technical project. 
 Is of a concise and simplified nature, such that reporting for the sake of reporting is avoided. 
Further detail or clarification will be provided to interested parties upon request, if it is 
deemed that this is beneficial to the success or delivery of the project. 
 Omits the reporting of information flagged as highly confidential, at the request of the 
Sponsor. In particular, information pertaining to memos from the Office of the Minister for 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery is not to be disclosed in any circumstances, as the risk and 
consequences of leaked information are far reaching to CERA & the Public alike. 
 Outlines the mandate for the project in the following logical sequence; General Issues, Work 
Preparation, Management & Control, Organisation & Staffing/Resources, Procurement and 
Information, Communication & Reporting and Risks. 
 This mandate clarifies the authority of the Project Manager (Student) and the direction 
which should be obeyed and defines the authority to act. 
2.0     GENESIS OF THE PROJECT 
This project serves the following purposes for the Student and Sponsor alike: 
 For the Student, it forms the industry experience academic requirement of the qualification 
“Masters in Engineering Management”.  
 For the Sponsor (for this specific project), it provides a unique opportunity for systems 
review and development from an independent academic perspective. It also imparts 
additional resources to a highly complicated Crown Project, where it is apparent that 
innovative and “systems thinking approaches” are paramount to effective completion. 
Furthermore, the project explores the alternatives to employing a graduate and provides a 
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good medium for brand awareness and a slightly different approach to marketing and 
company development. 
3.0     GENERAL ISSUES 
3.1 PM Responsibility 
Throughout the first month of the project (October), a general understanding of the Port Hills Land 
Clearance Program (PHLCP) was reached, such that the constraints of the project could be well 
understood. It was determined by the Student and the Sponsors through sit down talks that little to 
no progress had been made toward solving the third most important constraint of the project – 
retaining walls and related technical and policy decision making. Furthermore, it was recognised that 
the Student has a keen interest in geotechnical engineering and would thus be a logical choice to 
help drive progress in managing this constraint.  
The Student has been granted permission to make this aspect of the PHLCP the primary focus of the 
MEM Project and managing this constraint from an Operations standpoint would be under the 
delegation of the Student. Here it must be noted that although the Student is to be the “go to guy” 
regarding retaining walls, the underlying responsibilities of managing the entire PHLCP and its 
associated constraints lie with the Superiors of the Student. Here, a guidance type role between the 
Student & the Sponsor will ensure that the project does not lose direction and that the Sponsors 
personal responsibilities of managing the entire project are met. 
3.2 Authority Delegation 
Contractually the Student does not have staff underneath his command or at his disposal, however 
for all intents and purposes of working in a Government Department whose primary focus is the 
rebuild of Christchurch, it is clear that a collaborative approach between all staff is required. For this 
reason, the Student is able to make requests to other personnel, where it is considered in the best 
interests of the rebuild as a whole.  
A significant amount of collaboration on managing the retaining walls constraint with Policy Teams is 
required. Where necessary, the Student may be required to make requests for resources or work 
delegation to this team. As the Student’s direct Superior, Brenden Winder (Operations Manager) sits 
in on all Policy-Operations Retaining Walls meetings, often it will be the role of Brenden to 
coordinate delegation of works to Policy. 
3.3 Scope of Responsibilities  
The scope of responsibilities extends to all matters related to retaining walls from an operational 
standpoint. This involves (but is not limited to) data analysis, field work, negotiation and 
collaboration with stakeholders. The Sponsor provided the following brief before progression of the 
project, which stands as a ‘stake in the ground’ for what is expected: 
 “Identify the key issues for the Port Hills Building Clearance Programme and review the 
systems and processes that are being developed.” 
 “The student will work alongside the Port hills team to gain an understanding of the 
stakeholders, funding, programme and delivery of the Port Hills Project. They will then apply 
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the knowledge gained during the MEM course to provide a summary of the key issues and 
recommendations on how the Port Hills Building Clearance Programme could be enhanced.” 
This statement was issued in early September, before the project was begun. Significant reading and 
critical evaluation on the PHLCP Project and other similar projects (Flat Lands Clearance Project) was 
conducted throughout the first month. This served the purpose of familiarisation of the constraints, 
such that the focus of the project could be refined. The refined scope of responsibilities should now 
read as such: 
 “Identify the key issues for the resolution of retaining wall remediation, coordination and 
sequencing, within the clearance and rebuild activities of the PHLCP” 
 “This involves identifying the technical limitations that have been encountered thus far, 
limiting the progression of managing this constraint. Once these limitations are identified, a 
system or process mapping tool should be developed such that these issues may be simplified 
and critical policy decisions forced from a bottom-up approach.” 
3.4 Changes to Authority 
Changes to Authority are high. CERA has a high rate of internal promotion, as the issues faced are 
more readily solved by those currently in the organisation familiar with the operations and culture of 
CERA. Throughout the course of this project it may be possible that the Student’s direct Superiors 
receive promotion, such that a new member of the team will need to be brought up to speed with 
the work the Student is performing. Any changes to authority will be dealt with should they arise. 
 It is unlikely within the period of this project that the Student will receive promotion as this would 
be likely to severely impact the direction of the MEM Project and undermine progress made thus far. 
The Authoritive structure at present is considered sufficient to successfully deliver to the 
requirements of both the MEM Report and the CERA internal responsibilities. Post project 
completion in the latter stages of February, it is likely that the Student’s role will be refined to reflect 
the additional responsibility required for more rapid progress, as the clearance project begins 
toward late March / early April 2014. 
 
4.0     WORK PREPARATION 
4.1 Document Preparation 
This Project Mandate serves the function of complementing the Project Charter (Version 1), for the 
purposes of outlining the project in the initial stages, such that the scope and project specific 
requirements are well understood. However, it must be recognised that the value of such 
documents may be limited. The continually evolving nature of project management and this project 
in particular, means that this document is highly exposed to scope creep. The negative connotations 
of scope creep are often misleading. Scope creep is a necessary requirement as a project adapts to 
the environment it operates in, or requires more resources or people to complete the initial 
appraisal produced in a Charter, Proposal or Mandate. 
4.2 Key Success Indicators 
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Currently the success indicators are in the timeliness of conclusions drawn and the breadth, depth 
and validity of said conclusions. Regular progress reporting (every two weeks, or as significant 
progress is made) is completed for the interest of both the Sponsor and Supervisor. Upon reviewing 
these reports, the Sponsor conducts sit down meeting to discuss the direction of the project and 
possible changes or further focus points. Currently there are a large number of qualitative unknowns 
which are difficult to formalise into indicators of a qualitative nature. Significant progress is being 
made in this area such that time, cost, man hours or life safety risk can be presented as parameters 
to be used as indicators of project performance. 
4.3 Interpreting Project Objectives 
The Project Objectives, as presented in Section 3.3: Scope of Responsibilities are also interpreted in 
this section. From the Sponsor’s perspective, the brief had to be kept as simple and unconstrained as 
possible, for the purposes of not giving away too many clues as to the issues surrounding the 
project. This would’ve defeated the purposes of paying a ‘consultant’ to complete “independent 
review”. Bearing this in mind, it is advantageous for the Sponsor to review the current direction and 
objectives, such that the Project does not drift too far from the original intent. The Sponsor has 
verbally reached agreement with the Student toward the evolved objectives of the Project and is in 
support of the current direction of the Project. 
4.4 Interpreting Technical Specifications 
Technical specifications will be interpreted using ‘sound engineering judgement’. The large number 
of unknowns means that this role encounters a large degree of judgement in interpreting descriptive 
qualitative data into hard quantitative data. Much of the work which is currently being completed is 
unique in nature, which can be expected as a result of a significant natural disaster. For this reason 
there is little to no literature, external experience or industry best practice, resulting in engineering 
or technical decisions which are made through pilot studies or anticipated effects.  
4.5 Establishing Baseline Plans 
As previously mentioned, establishing project planning is difficult given the nature of the project (see 
risk register), but not impossible. Efforts are being developed into implementing project 
management tools such as Gantt Charts and project sequencing analysis to enforce milestones or 
performance planning. The difficulty here arises in the limited authority granted to the Student in 
implementing deadlines or performance measurables for Policy Staff, whose decision making 
process drives much of the Operational progress. Improvements will be made in this area where 
further experience permits.  
4.6 Integrating Project Activities 
As always project management draws upon ‘soft’ people skills to cross departmental or other 
common internal barriers. A large degree of tactfulness is being drawn upon here as each 
department within CERA has its own measurables and desired deliverables. Utilising the authority of 
my Superiors, notably Brenden Winder (Operations Manager) will allow for an effective top-down 





5.0     ORGANISATION & STAFFING RESOURCES 
 
5.1 Organisational Design for Project Duration 
The Superiors for this project are; through CERA, Brenden Winder (Operations Manager) and Allan 
Shortland (Demolition PMO – Project manager), through RCP Ltd, Mike Jeffery (Senior Project 
Manager) and Matt Allen (Director). These personnel are Operations focused. There are no lines of 
command for Policy personnel. Any engagement of the Policy Department will be through the 
Students Superiors. 
5.2 Internal & External Functional Units 
Internal Functional Units through which this project will engage in include Operations and Policy, 
while external units include NZTA, SCIRT, CCC, Port Hills Geotechnical Group and the Christchurch 
Retaining Walls Group. Each of these stakeholders has their own specific agendas and the position of 
CERA/RCP must be considered when consulting with these agencies. Of the NZTA, SCIRT, CCC and 
other community groups, CERA is the lowest priority functional unit and rebuild activities must be 
coordinated and sequenced with the priorities of other stakeholders considered first. 
5.3 Mobilising Resources 
Will be conducted under the permission and guidance of CERA Operations Manager, Brenden 
Winder. With the exception of using company vehicles to conduct field work, this has not been 
encountered yet. Verbal agreement has been acknowledged whereby if resources are required then 
Brenden is the first ‘port of call’. 
5.4 Staff Selection, Hiring & Dismissal & Training 
This is not considered a likely element of the MEM Project. Where suggestion of further staffing 
resources are required, this would be discussed with CERA Senior Management. 
5.5 Resolving Team Conflicts 
It is not anticipated team conflicts will occur. Team conflicts are rare within the organisation as the 
function of CERA is primarily focused on the Christchurch Rebuild. 
 
6.0     MANAGEMENT & CONTROL 
6.1 Limits to Approval Authority 
It is not anticipated approval will be required for any resource not currently readily available to the 
Student. Any such approvals will be discussed with Seniority and a decision reached based on case 





6.2 Project Management and Technical Management Decision Making 
Decision making will be made by the Student and presented on a weekly basis in Thursdays 
Operations weekly meetings. Upon review and general consensus of Operational Staff, decisions will 
be implemented and signed off through Seniority. 
6.3 Quality Assurance 
Quality is assured through frequent discussions with Seniority (Brenden Winder & Mike Jeffery) on a 
daily basis and through formal meetings following progress reporting. PowerPoint Presentation of 
Project progress is currently presented to all RCP staff members in staff meetings on a regular basis. 
These communication initiatives ensure that feedback can be received and additional output can be 
added through independent technical staff currently working on other non-related aspects of the 
rebuild. Feedback and improvement suggestions are taken on board such that the quality of work 
produced is at a level considered acceptable to the Sponsors & Stakeholder expectations. 
6.4 Pass/Fail Issues 
Potential issues regarding sub-standard quality or misconduct on behalf of the Student will be raised 
by the Sponsor sooner rather than later to avoid potential dissatisfaction of the final output. 
Potential issues the Student has with the Sponsor affecting the output of the project will be raised in 
a timely manner. 
6.5 Approving/Rejecting Changes 
In the judgement of the Student, changes which do not affect the ability of the Project to meet its 
requirements will not need to be run past Seniority. Essentially a discretionary approach will be 
applied, whereby any significant changes will require input, feedback and critical evaluation from the 
Project Supervisor (Piet Beukman) and the Sponsors alike. The requirements of the project have 
settled and it is unlikely that major approvals or rejections will be required throughout the remaining 
course of this Project. 
6.6 Sign-off for Transfer of Final Results 
Sign-off will be treated in accordance with MEM Protocols. At the satisfaction of the Sponsor’s 
review of the Draft Project Report, a final grade will be recommended and a statement made and 
signed off by the Sponsor for final grade apportionment from the Supervisor, Piet Beukman. 
 
7.0 PROCUREMENT 
7.1 Selecting & Engaging Consultants or Goods & Services 
This is not considered a likely element of the MEM Project. Where suggestion of external 





7.2 Approvals & Deliverables 
Whereby approvals are requested for goods & services, external consultants or hiring of additional 
staff, a set of deliverables will be produced which outlines the expectations of these additional 
resources. These deliverables are what the approvals will be benchmarked to, to ensure quality 
assurance and efficient allocation of resources. These deliverables will be discussed in conjunction 
with Senior Management.  
 
8.0     INFORMATION & COMMUNICATIONS REPORTING 
8.1 Supervising Collection of Stakeholder Requirements 
The stakeholders (Governing Agencies as mentioned previously, community groups and CERA) 
requirements have been collaborated through formal verbal discussions in post progress reporting 
meetings and in weekly Port Hills Operations meetings. These are well understood and collated in 
the internal CERA document “Port Hills – Business Case”, which is a reference tool developed for all 
Operations staff working in the PHLCP. 
8.2 Setting up Project Information Systems 
The project information systems consist of access to the CERA intranet and private Operations Staff 
drive, furthermore, as an employee directly employed by RCP, the Student has access to the RCP 
Contractors drive. All current information pertaining to the PHLCP may be found in these drives, 
while new information collected in the field or otherwise summarised in the purposes of the Project 
will be deposited to these drives. This allows for transparency in the work created throughout the 
project and allows for ease of access of project information for other personnel dependent on the 
information to carry out their job specific responsibilities.  
8.3 Determining Scope 
The scope of information reporting will be such that the Scope of Responsibilities (Section 3.3) are 
met. This will require output of a report titled “An Independent Review of Project Management 
Processes for CERA’s Port Hills Land Clearance Programme”. A draft version of this report will be 
submitted to the Sponsor by the first Friday of February 2014, while revisions and suggested 
improvements will take place in the following week, for submission of a final copy to the Project 
Supervisor by the second Friday of February 2014.  
8.4 Contacting & Liaison with Stakeholders 
The primary point of contact with Stakeholders is through email or phone call. This is a frequent 
occurrence, particularly with SCIRT, CCC & NZTA. Meetings or further liaison can be arranged from 
the initial contact, where required. Here a common sense approach is adopted.  
8.5 Media and output Communications 
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The Student is not authorised to make statements to media in any form, unless permission is 
granted from CERA Operations Manager, Brenden Winder. All output communications are to remain 
confidential and a confidentiality agreement has been reached between Project Sponsor RCP, 
University of Canterbury and the Student. Furthermore, verbal conversation of CERA confidential 
information is prohibited in all circumstances. CERA information which is publicly available may be 




This project represents a complex mixture of risks ranging from technical, economic, social, 
environmental and political in nature. 
9.1 Port Hills Land Clearance Programme General Risk Overview 




















A1     PROGRESS REPORTS 
 
A1.1     WEEK 1 – 2 
 
PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD MONDAY 23RD SEPTEMBER – FRIDAY 4TH OCTOBER 
 
This interim progress report summarises my exposure to the Port Hills Land Clearance Programme in 
the initial two weeks and looks to refine the role as described in the MEM Industry Project 
Scholarship. These observations are a result of project brief, methodology and policy review, within 
the CERA Operations Team and to a lesser degree, on-site visits. Incremental progress reporting 
throughout the project is expected to continue on a monthly basis following this date (to be 
confirmed).  
 
Legislation / Policy 
 Crown’s general/common law powers have been overtaken by CER ACT. Issues surrounding whether 
50% offer for uninsured and vacant land properties can be made. Decision being appealed by CERA 
and Minister as this will require the Zoning Review process to be re-evaluated, with potentially wider 
implications of whether previous Ministerial decisions were within the powers of legislation. This 
does not affect insured property owners, but will affect whether the 233 red zoned properties with 
50% offers can be included in the programme of works. The Zoning Review is outside the influence 
of the Operations Team, however contingencies could be made. 
 
 All current and proposed new red zoned properties need to be geographically mapped such 
that the effect of the inclusion (or exclusion) of these properties can be analysed. This Zoning 
Review will have implications for access, tendering of clusters, insurance recoveries, 
methodology preparation and the entire scope of the programme. The effect of Zoning Review 
can be mitigated through planning, while the time is available before an announcement. 
 
 There appears to be confusion surrounding demolition legislation, and the exact requirements here. 
Although, demolition is directly managed by the Contractor, not CERA, ultimately costs are passed 
onto CERA. Furthermore, many properties within the Clearance Programme are likely to be dirty 
demolitions, which are costly, time consuming and generally detrimental to the clearance process. 
The potential impacts of incorrect demolition execution are far reaching, such as media attention 
(particularly around the hot topic of asbestos), site contamination and litigation.  
 
 It would be beneficial to explore the legal requirements surrounding the demolition process, in 
particular the handling of dirty demolition and asbestos removal. At present, the process may 
be either a case of “overkill”, in which case Lean Thinking should be applied, to identify the 
unnecessary steps or the contrary where potential problems are looming unless the correct 
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processes are tightened and strictly enforced. The first port of call here may be to contact waste 
sites, such as Kate Valley Landfill or CCC to establish their commercial requirements.  
 
 Clearly bureaucratic issues will surround the processes of clearance when engaging other Authoritive 
figures such as NZTA, ECan, CCC. For example, processing of applications for methodologies such as 
Traffic Management Plans and Waste Management Plans for clearance may take over five business 
days. While it may be difficult to increase the administrative efficiency of such agencies, considering 
the scope of the project may be in excess of three years, any slight improvements could be beneficial 





 Methodology for clearance is complex as we know which properties will fall under which category 
(Option 1 Total Loss, Option 1 Repair, Option 2 Total Loss, Option 2 Repair), but there is uncertainty 
as to when these properties will become available for clearance. Insurance is stalling this process. 
Improving the efficiency of insurance recovery and clearance is most likely out of the scope of my 
works and in any case complex, although the ability to forecast the clearance process may be 
possible.  
 
 From completed properties so far, it could be possible to forecast how long the insurance 
process is likely to take for each category (Option 1 TL, Option 1 R, Option 2 TL, Option 2 R). If 
this estimation is possible, we can then attach estimated start dates to a map of red zoned 
properties which will help in analysis and planning of multiple access and demolition clusters. 
This may result in demolition delays for properties which are available for clearance, until 
suitable clusters form. Would need to determine whether the cost savings from clearance as a 
cluster would outweigh the delays to houses which are available for clearance. 
 
Retaining Walls 
 Aurecon report on retaining wall assessments for the Clifton/Kinsey cluster contains detailed 
assessment on all walls in the area. If this type of methodology for assessment is adopted by the 
Contractor, both repair and assessment of retaining walls will be cost intensive. Minimising 
assessments of retaining walls and minimising repair of retaining walls is critical.  
 
 CERA does not own all retaining walls on settled properties. We need to factor in the 
disputed/not disputed statues of retaining walls into the methodology for walls that require 
assessment. ie. At this stage, only assessing retaining walls that are under CERA ownership, or 
alternatively meet some agreement with CCC whereby the cost associated with retaining walls 
assessed by CERA / Contractor are passed onto CCC should retaining wall dispute determine 
non CERA ownership.  
 
 As large areas of houses are planned for clearance, will the existing Council roads for these 
areas remain in place? If not, then it would not be necessary to retain the road and 
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subsequently there may be a category of retaining walls supporting roads, assessed for repair 
which do not require repair as a result of the end use of the supported road. There may be 







 How will the clearance program affect the GNS model and 1/10,000 risk model? The boundaries are 
almost certain to change following clearance of houses, altering of topography and removal of 
retaining walls. Furthermore, I’m interested in analysing this 1/10,000 risk figure a little further. 
Although, red zoning decisions have been made already and are almost certain to remain in place 
(with exception of ZR), it would be an interesting academic topic to analyse the seemingly arbitrary 
nature of this figure as the consequences of its selection are far reaching to red zoned residents. I 
feel that review of such a consequential recommendation is relevant as this is the basis for all red 
zone boundaries. Such a review could provide H&S recommendations and identify areas of particular 





At this stage acting on review of Project Scopes, Methodologies and Policy and the corresponding 
highlighted issues is limited without further exposure to some of the Port Hills Sites and the on-site 
procedures of Project Management Personnel. Throughout the following reporting period – one 
month (to be confirmed), I intend to work alongside team members in a greater capacity, to 
complement the reviewing of procedures and analysis conducted in the office. Discussion of the key 
issues highlighted above with Mike Jeffery and Brendan Winder will provide further insights into the 
areas of focus which are likely to add the most value to the delivery of the project. Following this, I 





As stated in my initial Project Brief, by mid February, 2014 RCP and CERA can expect a full report of 
the issues encountered in the delivery of this project, possible or executed mitigation to these 
issues, and the result or expected results of such mitigation. RCP and CERA may choose to take on 
board these conclusions at their will, but it is intended that most issues encountered will have been 




A1.2     WEEK 3 – 4 
 
PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD MONDAY 7th OCTOBER – FRIDAY 18TH OCTOBER 
 
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE 
Further developments have been made on some of the issues highlighted in the interim progress 
report, notably demolition legislation and retaining wall remediation. Technical analysis on retaining 
wall remediation has been limited to the planning stage and particular attention has been paid to 
how this technical analysis could be performed and the information which needs to be collated for 
such analysis. Clarification has been reached on demolition activities involving potential 
contaminants and the legal framework which must be adhered to. I believe I now have a firmer 
understanding of this.  
 
WHAT HASN’T BEEN DONE 
There has been no time allocated toward the previously highlighted issues of analysis of insurance 
settlement patterns, analysis of zoning review effects and possible bureaucratic improvements. 
However, my initial thoughts are that useful progress could be made in the first two of these issues, 
under guidance from the Insurance and Operations Teams respectively. 
Implementing bureaucratic improvements are within my scope but to a large degree outside my 
abilities, which is to be expected of a new employee in a large organisation with limited experience. 
Improvements would be made through consultation at the management level between agencies and 
internally. It is intended to continue to identify such deficiencies, through conversing with fellow 
colleagues and my personal experiences alike. This will allow a medium for feedback, reported from 
a bottom up approach, which seniority may choose to act upon or repudiate.  
 
DEMOLITION LEGISLATION 
 Of concern for the PHLCP is the presence of hazardous materials in demolition clearance 
properties, in particular Asbestos Fibre products typical in many houses pre 1990’s construction 
and solvents, paints and chemicals typically stored in garages and external dwellings. The 
relevant legislation which applies to treatment of this waste is the Health & Safety in 
Employment Act 1992, Health & Safety in Employment (Asbestos) Regulations 1998, Building 
Act 2004 and Resource Management Act 2004. All four regulations relating to Asbestos, 
ascertain that the safety of workers must be protected when the presence of hazardous 
materials is detected. In relation to Asbestos, legislation does not state minimum allowable 
contamination levels from testing procedures, but instead requires that the isolation and 
decontamination procedures as stated in DOL “New Zealand Guidelines for the Management & 
Removal of Asbestos” must be adopted when any trace of Asbestos is identified.  
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CERA current practice in hazardous material detection is to implement testing procedures in 
methodology where it is suspected or known that such materials exist. In the case of positive 
identification, this material must be removed and treated as hazardous according to procedure. 
Further tests may be required to determine if the contamination is localised at the testing 
points or if there is widespread contamination across the site. Further action is required if 
widespread contamination is determined. Guidance from environmental engineering 
consultants is often relied upon for large structures, where internal inspection is prohibitive due 
to safety concerns, but the hard demolition and subsequent on-site waste stockpiles are 
accessible for testing. Potential site wide testing procedures must therefore be determined 
necessary or not by a certified environmental professional.  
In the case of the Port Hills properties, it may be more efficient to treat a dirty demolition as 
widespread on site contamination rather than trying to isolate the source of contamination and 
distinguish clean waste from hazardous waste, which may be economic on larger sites in the 
city demolitions. Thus the need for such discretionary environmental advice should be far more 
limited as the process of isolating asbestos and hazardous materials in a demolished property 
which was unsafe to assess would be time consuming and less economic than simply removing 
all the material as a dirty demolition.  
 
RETAINING WALLS 
 Due to the large degree of uncertainty surrounding the remediation of retaining walls I have 
highlighted this as an area of focus. Understanding the costs likely to be incurred by CERA in 
repairing these walls is difficult considering the vast majority have not been assessed for 
damage by Geotechnical Engineers and the insurance coverage the Crown will acquire on 
Option 1 properties varies from no coverage to partial and full coverage. There is no cost 
recovery for repairs or demolitions on Option 2 settlements as the Crown does not acquire the 
insurance policy. 
 
 A cost estimate for the repair of all CERA owned retaining walls could be achieved in one of two 
ways: 
 
1) - Use data that may be available to CERA on the SCIRT retaining wall repairs. Analyse, interpret 
and categorise repair techniques and associated costs and apply these to CERA owned walls 
that meet the same categorical requirements.  
 
I have not taken the time to explore this option too far as although the associated costs to 
CERA would be low, the level of certainty of the projects cost would also be low due to gaps in 
data and attempting to extrapolate the SCIRT data set, where the profile of retaining walls 
may be vastly different to CERA owned walls. 
 
 
2) - Undertake a pilot study of a representative sample of PH retaining walls to determine the 
profile of damage and likely remediation techniques.  
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- It is anticipated that many damaged walls would require simple repair, such as additional fill 
to the base of the retaining wall, burying the wall or complete demolition and slope re-grade.  
- Demolition and re-grade would be viable where the wall is not supporting significant 
infrastructure and the removal is not likely to impart additional load bearing on down-slope 
structures at or above capacity.  
-The costs associated with these types of repairs would be dependent on availability of on-site 
fill, size of the wall and earthworks. The associated cost estimates are expected to be 
moderately accurate.  
- Where the wall requires complex repair due to up-slope critical infrastructure, down-slope 
wall retention or slope instability due to removal, methods may include steel plated tieback 
anchoring, battered steel bracing or construction of a new wall offset from the existing 
structure in the worst cases. 
- The complex repair method will be dependent on retaining wall type, size of wall, criticality 
of dependent infrastructure, access availability, assessed wall damage and pricing of 
associated methods. The pricing estimates will have a lower degree of accuracy than simple 
repairs and could be based on other similar wall repairs completed by SCIRT. 
- Through working with the CERA Insurance Team, policies acquired by CERA as part of the 
settlement process would be assessed to determine the amount of cost recovery likely from 
each property’s repair, to determine the residual cost to be absorbed by CERA. 
 
It is my opinion that such a pilot study could be completed at low cost to CERA, whereby 
damaged walls are not actually repaired, but instead assessed for the likely remediation 
technique and a cost estimate for this technique applied. This could be completed by myself, 
under guidance from a geotechnical engineer in a limited capacity for more complex walls. 
Considering the large amount of cost uncertainty towards repairing retaining walls, a low cost 
study of this nature could provide useful information on the likely costs of the entire project, 
within a specified confidence interval. This pilot study could be extrapolated further, should 
the scope of the PHLCP increase in the coming months. Time, cost and resources apportioned 
to this study would be dependent on the level of cost certainty deemed acceptable by CERA. 





It is my intention, to further research Retaining Wall Repair Option 2 over the next period 
(Monday 21st October – Friday 1st November) to determine the scope of the project, potential 





- H&S risks exist in potential site visits to affected properties. 




A1.3     WEEK 4 – 6 
 
PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD MONDAY 21st OCTOBER – THURSDAY 30TH OCTOBER 
 
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE 
 Planning of information requirements for retaining wall treatment in the PHLCP 
 Possible operational approaches to decision making on a given retaining wall 
 Initial Operations discussion with Policy Makers to determine a planning strategy for an 
integrated approach to the problem 
Through discussions with RCP/CERA surrounding the previous progress report it is apparent that 
there is a need to direct attention towards the resolution of retaining wall related operational issues. 
Currently, this aspect of the PHLCP has been shelved, due to the engineering complexity, lack of 
complete information and resourcing issues surrounding geotechnical expertise. The Retaining Walls 
element of the PHLCP is incurring costs through inactivity and the time available to simplify the 
problem is available, due to project delays resulting from the Crown Zoning Review. It is imperative 
that progress is made before clearance activities proceed, as the ability to make a decision on the 
treatment options for a given retaining wall has the potential to delay housing and land clearance 
activities.  
 
WHAT HASN’T BEEN DONE 
Progress has been diverted from all previously reviewed systems and processes mentioned in the 
first two progress reports and attention paid to retaining wall issues. As per the initial work plan, 
after one month of internal review of all major aspects of CERA PHLCP Operations, it is deemed that 
focusing on retaining walls has the potential to add the greatest value to CERA and is of greatest 
interest to myself.  
 
RETAINING WALLS 
From an Operational point of view, three key decisions must be made: 
(1). Based on the technical assessment of a wall, considering all relevant factors, is remediation 
required? I.e. leave wall as is or treat wall in some way 
(2). If remediation is required, what is the most cost effective approach to doing so? 
(3). How will this remediation be coordinated? 
 
The ability to make Decision 1 may need to collate and consider the following: 
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 Current Information 
 Existing data on wall from CERA, CCC (Lim Reports), NZTA, SCIRT, Insurance or other 
relevant Authoritive figures 
 Historical data may include type of wall, date of construction, repairs or additions to 
wall, size (length, height, depth), materials used, what’s supported above and below, 
drainage, seepage & storm water aspects, engineering drawings/plans, ownership, 
maintenance, liability 
 Recent data as a result of assessments 
 Restrictions on information sharing. Note the Proposed Integrated Programme 
Delivery Initiative and its possible relevance here. 
 
 Ownership 
 Who presently owns the wall?  
 Currently a CCC template for determining ownership (refer to CERA Retaining Walls 
Brief Appendix 1, 6 different ownership scenarios identified) 
 Who will own the wall in the future? 





 What needs to be assessed? 
 What has already been assessed? 
 Do the walls currently assessed fit a standard framework for assessment or is 
reassessment required? 
 What is the standard framework/methodology for assessment? CCC has identified 
2,579 walls in RAMM (confirm what RAMM stands for), of which 662 are of known 
condition 
 What Geotechnical expertise and resources are required for assessment? 
 Are walls continually deteriorating/moving or has stability been reached, post 
earthquake? 




 Will the decision to demolish & re-grade, bury with fill or appropriately repair affect 
the structural integrity of surrounding walls up-slope or down-slope  
 Will this decision trigger slope movement and if so, is this manageable? 
 Will the decision to demolish & re-grade, bury with fill or appropriately repair affect 
the structural integrity network utilities, other infrastructure or remaining property?  
 How do we establish baseline measurables for dependencies between a wall and 
any relevant structure mentioned above? i.e. is a wall considered dependent if 
within a specified distance? OR should dependencies be determined on a case by 
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case basis as determined necessary by a Geotechnical Engineer, as opposed to 
applying a systematic decision framework? 
 
 Access 
 Which walls will have access issues for conducting assessments? 
 Will an assessed wall have accessibility issues for heavy machinery to perform repair 
works? 
 If there is access difficulty, is it likely that post demolition of the dwelling that there 
will be space freed up for accessibility?  
 
 Future Use 
 Are there any areas of land where the final use of the land is known? 
 What are the current options/are there any clues toward the likely final land use 
that could benefit the decision making process toward remediation? 
 Are there a set of final use options which when known, can be applied to the 
remediation options to make a decision? 
 
 Health & Safety 
 Are there properties considered too risky to access for retaining wall assessment? 
 Does there need to be a set of guidelines for H&S practice when assessing a wall, or 
should the assessment technique be at the discretion of the assessor/geotechnical 
engineer? 




 Is there a systematic process which can be applied to determining which walls are to 
be assessed first? 
 Prioritisation will likely need to consider; walls with risk to life, property, network 
utilities or infrastructure and may be categorised by; location, size or anticipated or 
known pre-assessed damage. 
 Sequencing is also likely to be a factor in prioritisation i.e. some properties are 
available for clearance, so these walls are available for assessment, whilst other 
properties have not settled, so the ability to legally access the property and assess 
the wall may not be possible 
 
Upon a detailed understanding of this information by the Geotechnical Engineer/Assessor, a decision 
must be made whether the wall is to remain as is, or whether treatment is required. Furthermore, 
an engineering recommendation should be made as to the most appropriate remediation technique 
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for simple cases, while for complicated cases a ranking of options should be stated for further 
investigation into cost viability.  
 
The ability to make Decision 2 may need to consider the following: 
 Cost Estimates 
 Available costing information on previously completed retaining wall works. This 
may be obtained through information based on a representative sample pilot study 
clearance cluster, or through SCIRT who has currently completed a large number of 
retaining wall repairs for CCC. 
 Throughout the assessment process, engaging contractors likely to have the capacity 
to complete the repairs and obtain feedback and estimates of likely costs for 
completion 
 
 Weighting system 
 A weighting system should be devised which factors the relevant engineering 
robustness of the recommended possible solutions and their associated estimated 
cost effectiveness to generate a final score for each possible remediation technique. 
 Engineering appropriateness will need to consider factors such as design life, ability 




 The insurance policies which apply to each property are differing in the level of 
insurance coverage assigned to retaining walls. 
 Understanding the policies and how they relate to each wall will provide an 
indication of the likely apportionment/cost recovery to be received by insurance.  
 From an Operations perspective, the policy and potential cost recovery on a given 
wall should not dictate the remediation applied to the wall, as the remediation 
decision should be based on technical engineering considerations. 
 
The ability to make Decision 3 may need to consider the following: 
 Availability of contractors able and willing to complete the works 
 Access to experienced geotechnical engineers able to conduct assessments, perform 
recommendations and accept liability 
 Ability to coordinate the works in conjunction with current work programmes, the Public 







So far this report has considered the constraints and how these need to be managed from an 
Operational point of view. From a policy perspective, there are many more questions which need to 
be answered, notably: 
 
 Are the Operational resources required for execution readily available? 
 Who will pay? 
 What are the legal implications of the proposed Operational plan? 
From my point of view, the complexities, risks and constraints of the programme would make this a 
difficult programme to successfully execute by strictly following a Policy approach. Furthermore, this 
would be an extremely difficult programme to implement by attempting to restrict or framework 
engineering decisions via a categorical approach. Some walls are likely to encounter many of the 
difficulties explained above and their decision regarding remediation is likely to be unique. Sound 
engineering judgement will be required, where design codes or industry best practice knowledge 
does not exist for the distinct nature of the problem. The operational approach above could be 
implemented through using the powers of Policy to free up some of the operational constraints that 
exist.  
Further discussions and workshop sessions with Policy will resume Wednesday 6th November, whilst 
in the mean time I will be researching and investigating which of the above questions can be 
answered, to the Operational approach of managing this project. Following this Wednesday 
workshop, it is anticipated that both parties will have a clearer approach toward their respective and 
integrated progress plan. 
 
RISKS 
The following risks exist: 
 Retaining wall project is shelved, causing downstream delays to the PHLCP in the coming 
months 
 Scope creep, whereby the project attempts to draw in unrelated parties or aspects of the 
PHLCP. 
 Delays in progressing resolution of a plan/methodology towards retaining walls, which will 
encounter PHLCP delays further down the track. 
 Policy or Operations unable to secure the resources required to implement the project. 





A1.4     WEEK 7 – 9 
 
PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD MONDAY 1st NOVEMBER – FRIDAY 22nd NOVEMBER 
 
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE 
Progress has been made in developing an analytical model which attempts to categorise the 
qualitative data into quantitative data on retaining wall assessments completed in the Aurecon 
Report on the 104 walls relating to the 15 properties in the Kinsey Terrace/Clifton Terrace Cluster. 
This cluster is the most heavily damaged cluster, many of the properties are on the edge of a 40-50 
metre cliff which failed in the June 2011 Earthquake.  
The information in this spreadsheet is still being refined and will be presented to the Policy and 
Operations team on Thursday 28th November to determine the suitability of this analysis as a 
framework for the remaining walls when further assessment data becomes available. 
Arranged to meet with Ministry of Business Innovation & Employment Officials on site to discuss 
issues with Port Hills retaining walls and the possible testing of a sample of badly damaged walls. 
Refer to attached spreadsheet. 
RISKS 
No H&S risks exist as on site work is being kept to an absolute minimum 
There are no sequencing or time frame constraints as the demolition work on the Port Hills is stalled 
until other political constraints are managed. 
 
A1.5     WEEK 10 – 13 
 
PROGRESS REPORT FOR THE PERIOD MONDAY 1st NOVEMBER – FRIDAY 20th DECEMBER 
 
WHAT HAS BEEN DONE 
Progress has been made in developing an analytical model which attempts to categorise the 
qualitative data into quantitative data on retaining wall assessments completed in the Aurecon 
Report on the 104 walls relating to the 15 properties in the Kinsey Terrace/Clifton Terrace Cluster. 
This cluster is the most heavily damaged cluster, many of the properties are on the edge of a 30-40 
metre cliff which failed in the June 2011 Earthquake.  
The information in this spreadsheet is still being refined and was presented to the Port Hills 
Retaining Wall Team on Thursday 28th November to determine the suitability of this analysis as a 
framework for the remaining walls when further assessment data becomes available.  
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Refinements requested were: 
 The effect of SCIRT sequencing.  
 Profile of the property (visibility from large capacity arterial routes eg. City to Sumner Main 
Road). This has been incorporated into the model using Google Street View, which was 
deemed adequate and aligns with the purpose of the exercise (desk study analysis as 
opposed to in field analysis) 
 Access to the retaining wall. Analysis of the Aurecon Report “Clifton Hill Demolition Planning 
Pack” suggests that all walls in the cluster will ultimately become accessible post building 
clearance, with the on-site plant; excavators (long reach for difficult properties). It is 
suggested that this same equipment will be used for retaining wall demolitions. Factoring 
this information into the model is difficult as the demolition plans for each property are 
specific to the property, not necessarily the retaining walls on the property. A more relevant 
approach could be to consider walls which are likely to be demolished by long reach, as 
opposed to demolition with a standard excavator, described in the report. The key 
assumption here is that use of a long reach excavator for wall demolition implies there is a 
genuine safety concern for the particular wall and this could be used to validify the safety 
component already in the model. I am still working on teasing this information out of the 
Demolition Report and will make a call on this in the New Year. 
In addition to the analysis and data gathering exercise completed over this period, I have also been 
researching and reading on key engineering management principles, which may become useful in 
my final report. I have done a significant amount of reading on topics such as Operations Research, 
BPM, Decision Engineering and Process Improvement and possible case studies of these for disaster 
recovery management, at the request of my Supervisor. It was deemed there is likely to be high 
relevance to the work I’m conducting for CERA. Analysing and reporting on industry best practice in 




 Complete current model and verify that all factors are considered which are considered 
important from a ‘desk study’ analysis perspective. 
 Collate all remaining information available on Port Hills retaining walls and determine 
whether it will be simple to apply the current model parameters to new information. 
 Finalise a model which is likely to be simple to incorporate with the available data and 
expected available data 
 Continue work on academic literature and case study review 





A2     RETAINING WALLS SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
 






A2.2     CERA/AURECON RETAINING WALLS ASSESSMENT 
 
From: Louis Collingwood  
Sent: Monday, 5 August 2013 11:24 a.m. 
To: Brenden Winder <Brenden.Winder@cera.govt.nz> (Brenden.Winder@cera.govt.nz) 
Cc: Mikael Gartner; Cornel Mawhinney 




As discussed on Thursday’s meeting, a component of the Clifton-Kinsey Terrace Port Hills Demolition process is to collect 
relevant information on retaining walls and building structures in this cluster. The current cluster has been identified as below, 




















Based on Thursday’s meeting we have been approved to collect information on the retaining walls and buildings. We are 
expecting different levels of damage and risk. Buildings will be visually assessed to determine building construction, level of 
damage, if restricted areas around the structures need to be put in place, and if there is a potential to strip-out the structure or if 
a dirty demolition is required. We are expecting approximately 25-35 different retaining walls and 15 buildings with differing 
levels of damage and risk. Some walls support and or protect roads, infrastructure, and/or buildings. We will not access areas 
that are restricted without approval from a geotechnical engineer knowledgeable with the geotechnical risks in this area. 
  
The scope of this work includes technical documentation report(s) that includes 
1)     Visual Inspection of retaining walls/building structures with photos 
2)     Documentation of wall height & length/building construction, type, and damage 
3)     Assessment of Risk to Life and Property (Visual Assessment only) 
4)     Engineering recommendation for demolition (Visual Assessment only) 
  
Ownership of retaining walls it to be determined by CERA. It is expected that information from this document will be used by 
CERA for various purposes, but the main purpose is to facilitate the development of demolition scoping documents and the 
development of demolition methodology documents. 
  
We propose carrying out these works at Cost Plus to a maximum. Estimates for maximums are: 
-       $21,000 for the assessment of retaining walls 
-       $18,000 for the assessment of buildings 
  
Note: The attached plan also shows five additional Red Zone properties on Clifton Hill – 28, 31, 33, 49 and 51 Clifton Terrace. If 
these properties become Crown owned, we are able to incorporate them into our assessments at reduced costs: 
-       $2,500 for the assessment of retaining walls 
-       $2,000 for the assessment of buildings 
-       $3,000 for geohazard assessment 
  
Please confirm instruction to proceed with these assessments, confirming if the additional properties should be added to the 
scope of works. We will carry out this work as a variation under our existing contract, Project ref. 234893, and are able to begin 
on 6 August 2013 provided instruction is received today. 
  






Louis Collingwood CEng MICE 
Senior Geotechnical Engineer | Ground Engineering | Aurecon 
DD +64 3 375 1335 | M +64 21 834 219 
E louis.collingwood@aurecongroup.com 
Address to Document Building Information 
Address 
38 Clifton Terrace 
39 Clifton Terrace 
40 Clifton Terrace 
42 Clifton Terrace 
44 Clifton Terrace 
46 Clifton Terrace 
48 Clifton Terrace 
49 Clifton Terrace 
50 Clifton Terrace 
2 Kinsey Terrace 
4 Kinsey Terrace 
CCC Road – from 28 to 51 Clifton Terrace 
CCC Road - from 1, 2 & 4 Kinsey Terrace 
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A2.3     RETAINING WALLS MODEL BREAKDOWN 
 
Table 3: Retaining walls summary 
 













Unknown Major Minor None Unknown Yes No Unknown
104 36 28 15 14 6 5 48 24 8 24 45 56 3
percentage of total 35% 27% 14% 13% 6% 5% 46% 23% 8% 23% 43% 54% 3%
Risk to Life/PropertyDamageWall Type
Long Term 
Action





50 54 50 47 7 4 39 - 61
48% 52% 48% 45% 7% 4% 38% - 59%
Dependency Short Term ActionHeight > 1.5m
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Table 5: Damage correlation with wall type 
 
Major Minor None Unknown Total
Masonry 16 11 2 7 36
Stacked Stone 13 5 1 9 28
In-Situ Concrete 8 4 1 2 15
Timber King Post 6 3 3 2 14
Concrete Crib Wall 3 0 1 2 6
Other / Unknown 2 1 0 2 5
Major Minor None Unknown Total
Masonry 44% 31% 6% 19% 100%
Stacked Stone 46% 18% 4% 32% 100%
In-Situ Concrete 53% 27% 7% 13% 100%
Timber King Post 43% 21% 21% 14% 100%
Concrete Crib Wall 50% 0% 17% 33% 100%
Other / Unknown 40% 20% 0% 40% 100%
Benchmark (all  walls)
46% 23% 8% 23% 100%
Conclusion: 
- From this sample size, the major damage to a given wall does not appear to be dependent on 
wall type as there is l ittle variation from the benchmark.




- The type of wall constructed may have a bearing on the type of damage associated with the wall 
type.
- Masonry and In Situ Concrete Walls are ikely to have a larger amount of minor damage because 
the minor damage associated with these wall types (cracking, fracturing) is simple to detect.
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Major Minor None Unknown Total
Yes 22 14 2 12 50
No 26 7 6 8 47
Unknown 0 3 0 4 7
Height > 1.5m
Major Minor None Unknown Total
Yes 44% 28% 4% 24% 100%
No 55% 15% 13% 17% 100%
Unknown 0% 43% 0% 57% 100%
Benchmark (any 
height) 46% 23% 8% 23% 100%
Hypothesis: The type of damage may be related to the height of the wall.
Conclusion: From this sample size, the major damage to a given wall does not 






















Yes 18 9 9 6 5 3 50
No 15 17 6 7 0 2 47













Yes 36% 18% 18% 12% 10% 6% 100%
No 32% 36% 13% 15% 0% 4% 100%
Unknown 43% 29% 0% 14% 14% 0% 100%
Benchmark (any 
height) 35% 27% 14% 13% 6% 5% 100%
Conclusion: From this sample size, the wall type used does not appear to be dependent on the height of the wall 
(where the breakpoint for analysis is set at 1.5 m). Further analysis here could incorporate the length of the 
wall, or a larger break point (2 - 3 m may produce different results). Reviewing the raw data, it appears there are 
not many large stacked stone walls. The highlighted cells reflect this somewhat





Table 8: Retaining walls model damage and life risk by wall number 
 




major 1 minor 0.5 none 0.75 unknown 0 Yes 3 No 0 Unknown 1.5
Total 48 24 8 24 45 56 3
1-1 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0
1-2 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0
1-3 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0
1-4 0 0 1 0.75 0 0 1 0 0
1-5 0 1 0.5 0 0 1 3 0 0
1-6 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
1-7 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
1-8 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1-9 0 0 1 0.75 0 0 1 0 0
1-10 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
1-11 0 1 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 0
1-12 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
1-13 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1-14 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
1-15 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
1-16 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 0 0
1-17 0 0 1 0.75 0 0 1 0 0
1-18 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 0 0
1-19 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
Damage Risk to Life/Property
yes 1.5 no 0 Repair 0.5 Remove 0.25 Unknown 0.75 Leave in situ
50 54 4 39 61 0
1 1.5 0 1 0.5 0 0
1 1.5 0 1 0.5 0 0
1 1.5 0 0 1 0.25 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
1 1.5 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
0 1 0 0 1 0.25 0
1 1.5 0 0 0 1 0.75
1 1.5 0 0 0 1 0.75
1 1.5 0 0 1 0.25 0
0 1 0 0 1 0.25 0
0 1 0 0 1 0.25 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0.75
Dependency Short Term Action
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Table 10: Retaining walls model wall size and boundary issues by wall number 
 
Table 11: Retaining walls model total score and cumulative count by wall number 
 
 
m2 normalised to max 1
normalised to max 
value of cell BH7
GZ 1 RZ 0.33 Infrastructure 0.66 None 0
3 17 29 59
9.1 0.03 0.15 0 0 1 0.66 0
17.5 0.06 0.28 0 0 0 1 0
20.3 0.07 0.33 0 0 1 0.66 0
4 0.01 0.06 0 0 0 1 0
2.4 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 1 0
22.1 0.08 0.36 0 0 0 1 0
6 0.02 0.10 0 0 0 1 0
16.8 0.06 0.27 0 0 0 1 0
2.8 0.01 0.05 0 0 0 1 0
57.6 0.21 0.93 0 0 0 1 0
22.4 0.08 0.36 0 0 0 1 0
10 0.04 0.16 0 0 0 1 0
25.97312 0.09 0.42 0 0 0 1 0
21 0.08 0.34 0 0 1 0.66 0
125 0.45 1.50 0 0 1 0.66 0
34 0.12 0.55 0 0 1 0.66 0
2.5 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 1 0
30 0.11 0.48 0 0 0 1 0
6 0.02 0.10 0 0 0 1 0
wall area Boundary
raw total normalised to max 6 0 1 2 3 4 5
10 23 29 18 18 6
3.31 2.36 0 0 1 0 0 0 50 Clifton
2.78 1.98 0 1 0 0 0 0 50 Clifton
3.24 2.31 0 0 1 0 0 0 50 Clifton
1.56 1.12 0 1 0 0 0 0 50 Clifton
4.29 3.06 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 Clifton
5.11 3.64 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 Clifton
4.85 3.46 0 0 0 1 0 0 50 Clifton
1.02 0.73 1 0 0 0 0 0 50 Clifton
1.55 1.10 0 1 0 0 0 0 50 Clifton
5.68 4.05 0 0 0 0 1 0 50 Clifton
3.11 2.22 0 0 1 0 0 0 50 Clifton
1.91 1.36 0 1 0 0 0 0 50 Clifton
0.67 0.48 1 0 0 0 0 0 50 Clifton
3.25 2.32 0 0 1 0 0 0 50 Clifton
8.41 6.00 0 0 0 0 0 1 50 Clifton
6.96 4.96 0 0 0 0 1 0 50 Clifton
1.04 0.74 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Kinsey
3.73 2.66 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Kinsey




Table 12: Retaining walls model input weighting factors 
 
Table 13: Retaining walls model output distribution summary of all the walls 
 
 
Table 14: Retaining walls insurance breakdown 
Insurer Policy Wording Provisions 
EQC EQC Act Section 2: 
residential land means, in relation to any residential building, the 
following property situated within the land holding on which the 
residential building is lawfully situated: 
(a) the land on which the building is situated; and 
(b) all land within 8 metres in a horizontal line of the 
building; and 
(c) that part of the land holding which— 
(i) is within 60 metres, in a horizontal line, of the building; 
and 
(ii) constitutes the main access way or part of the main 
access way to the building from the boundary of the 
land holding or is land supporting such access way or 
Wall Area
Major Minor Unknown None Yes No Unknown Yes No Repair Remove Unknown GZ RZ Infrastructure (roads) None (Retaining not near boundary)
1 0.5 0.75 0 3 0 1.5 1.5 0 0.5 0.25 0.75 1.5 1 0.33 0.66 0




My judgement call from all info on a 
given retaining wall in Aurecon 
Report
Explanation
Is the wall retaining 
walls/important 
infrastructure above or 
will its failure affect 
walls/important 
As recommended in report. Long 
term actions not considered 
here as they are dependent on 
short term action
From analysis of Appendix A of Aurecon Report. Does the wall share a boundary 
with a green zone property, red zone property (CERA owned), Council 
Infrastructure, or no boundary (wall is away from the property boundaries)? 
Crude judegement calls made here
Stated in report. Based on 
judgement call from 
inspection for a less than 
moderate EQ event. Further 
clarification reqd.
WEIGHTING  FACTORS/INPUTS




(d) all bridges and culverts situated within any area 
specified in paragraphs (a) to (c); and 
(e) all retaining walls and their support systems within 60 
metres, in a horizontal line, of the building which are 
necessary for the support or protection of the building or 





AA Old Not specifically mentioned although “”walls” are covered as part of the 
description on “Building” along with fences etc. 
 AA New Included in definition of “Your home” but subject to limitation on 
pages 13 and 14 which only covers loss or damage to retaining walls if 
the event has also caused damage to residential buildings forming part 
of your home. 
 SIS Specifically covered on page 11. 
Limit of cover $10,000 and if over 1m high must have Council approval 
(page 26). 
AMI (SRES) AMI Premier House Not covered – “Property not covered by this policy” on page 2 
 AMI Market Value 
House 
Not covered – “Property not covered by this policy” on page 2 
 AMI Premier Rental Not covered – “Property not covered by this policy” on page 2 
Ansvar 
(ACS) 
Ansvar Home Ins Included in definition of “Home” (page 2). 
Insurer Policy Wording Provisions 
FMG HomePak Not covered (see definition of “House” on page 11) 
 RuralPak Not covered (see definition of “House” on page 12) 
IAG ASB Policy Covered under definition of “Home” (Section 1, 1a(ii)) 
 BNZ Premier Care (old) Not mentioned specifically.  Definition of “Home” includes 
“underground services, overhead electricity lines, walls, gates, paths, 
drives, swimming or spa pools, fences, shrubs, hedges and other 
domestic structures…” and is probably wide enough to cover retaining 
walls. 
 BNZ Premier Care 
(new) 
Covered under definition of “Home” (page 8). 
 NZI Echelon Covered under definition of “Home” (page 11). 
 NZI Houseowners Covered under definition of “House” (page 2) but no cover for damage 
to retaining walls caused by earthquake. (D4 Natural Disaster on page 
7) 
 State Comprehensive Covered under definition of “Home” (page 14) 
 State Essentials Covered under definition of “Home” (page 14) 
Lumley Safe and Sound Specifically covered for EQ damage (clause 2a on page 17). 
 Westpac “Walls” are covered in the defn of “Home” (page 39) and “retaining 
walls” are not specifically mentioned.  EQ cover appears to exclude 
“retaining walls” under (b) but my view would be that they are covered 
under (a). 
Tower Tower Provider House Only covered if caused by fire or impact of vehicle (page 6) – I.e. no 
cover for EQ damage. 
Vero Maxi Plan Home Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $10k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
 AMP Home Plan Maxi Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $10k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
 Brokernet MaxiPlan Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $10k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
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 BrokerWeb Home Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $25k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
 National Bank Cover Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $10k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
 ANZ Asset Protector Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $10k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
 Aon Stylecover 
Premier 
Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $20k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
 Marsh Multicover Specific Clause covers retaining walls to limit of $10k per event.  Walls 
over 1.5m must have Council approval. 
 
 
A3     NON INITIATED IMPROVEMENTS SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
A3.1     RMC Assessment Factors 
 
Factor 1: RM attitude 
 1 Initiative to take part in risk activities 
 2 Leaders support and encourage RM 
 3 Resources dedicated to projects in accordance to the severity of risk events identified 
Factor 2: RM culture 
 4 Every member is responsible for managing risk 
 5 Risk events are openly communicated within the team 
 6 Team members are familiar with RM concepts and methods 
 7 RM is widely practiced in every level of the team 
Factor 3: Risk identification capability 
 8 Potential risks could be identified for new projects 
 9 A systematic analysis method is used 
 10 Actual risks found are compared against initial identified risks 
Factor 4: Risk analysis capability 
 11 Every member grasps risk analysis skills 
 12 A systematic analysis method is used 
 13 The probability and severity of all risks could be assessed 
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Factor 5: Risk response capability 
 14 Risk impacts could be reduced at most extent 
 15 A systematic response method is used 
 16 Every member grasps effective risk response method 
 17 Appropriate measures are taken for reducing different risks 
Factor 6: Development and application of standardized RM process 
 18 Risks are consistently identified, analyzed, and responded throughout the project life cycle 
 19 RM process is standardized 
 20 RM process is woven into daily business processes of the organization 
 21 RM process is often reviewed to ensure its applicability 
 
A3.2     RMC Alternative Assessment Factors 
 
No. Factors Descriptions 
F01 Education 
background 
Attitudes toward risks within the decision making process may vary 
greatly, depending on contractors’ education background. Generally 
speaking, contractors with higher education tend to be more rational and 
cautious, while those who received little education tend to be more 
fearless and impulsive   
F02 Engineering 
experience 
Equipped with rich engineering and social experience, contractors can be 
more familiar with potential risks regarding the project, and thus the 
experience could play a role in assisting in decisions. Therefore, the risk 
attitude would, to a certain extent, be influenced by the experience F03 Social experience 
F04 Professional 
knowledge 
Different backgrounds across professional knowledge and scope of 
knowledge will influence contractors directly while dealing with 
professional project issues, and result in different risk attitudes 
F05 Scope of 
knowledge 
F06 Physical health Contractors’ physical health influences the pressure they can endure, 
the degree of their preferences to short-term benefits, and the 
corresponding ability to confront risks 
F07 Social status Undoubtedly, contractors with different social status hold different risk 
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No. Factors Descriptions 
attitudes, as they consider the same problem from different angles and 
depths 
F08 Character traits Character means the combination of qualities or features that 
distinguishes one person, group, or thing from another. Various kinds of 
character traits have been studied, who found that different character 
traits lead to different actions. For instance, contractors with 
independence traits prefer thinking and dealing with problems 
independently, and sometimes they may compel their ideas to others; 
while contractors with obedience traits tend to agree and accept 
others’ ideas, and they are generally of poor adaptability. All these 
different traits in character result in different risk attitudes 
F09 Boldness Here boldness means the traits of being willing to undertake things that 
involve risk or danger. Decision makers with this traits always have the 
ability to determine the right scheme timely and resolutely. 
F10 Values It means people’s ideas about what is right and wrong, or what is 
important in life. Within the same circumstance, attitudes may vary 
depending on the values, as some contractors are status-and-right 
oriented while others take money as the priority 
F11 Moral values Moral values is the quality of being in accord with standards of right or 
good conduct, or a system of ideas that fall into those same categories. 
As a member of the society, everyone has the unique moral values, 
which may influence the risk attitude 
F12 Decision 
motivation 
With specific decision motivation, the decision is of significant directivity, 
which results in the fact that the decision activity will move on toward 
expected direction and objective 
F13 Interest in the 
engineering 
To what degree are decision makers interested in the project can 
definitely influence the development and innovation within the 
construction period, and thus influence their risk attitudes 
F14 Judgment ability It refers to contractors’ abilities of analyzing and judging problems 
according to their own knowledge and experience. This ability plays an 
important role within the decision making process 
F15 Intuition It is the ability that is especially useful while dealing with problems of 
great complexity. Mostly, the solution obtained based on this may be 
very close to the optimum scheme 
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No. Factors Descriptions 
F16 Sensitivity to 
external 
information 
It refers to that contractors can make quick response and judgment to 
engineering variations by analyzing different external information 
F17 Psychological 
endurance 
It is the ability which enables contractors to endure pressures from 
variable sources   
F18 Willpower It is the ability to control the mind and body in order to achieve the goal 
F19 Desire for 
decision 
objectives 
Normally, desire can inspire people’s active actions toward particular 
objectives. Contractors’ actions, therefore, can be greatly influenced by 
the intensity of desires while confronting risks 
F20 Consequences of 
decision making 
Contractors may consider the consequences resulted from their 
decisions, and this in turn may affect their risk attitudes 
F21 Time constraints 
for decision 
making 
In some abrupt cases, quick response and decision making are required, 
as little time left for thorough discussion and consideration. In these 
cases, contractors’ risk attitudes vary a lot depending on time 
permission for making a decision 
F22 Completeness of 
project 
information 
Engineering information is vital in making the right decision, and it can, to 





Company’s economic strength always plays an important role to 
influence decision makers’ risk attitudes. According to an empirical 
study conducted, decision makers’ risk avoiding tendency would 




Good external economic environment can contribute to active actions of 
decision makers when encountering project risks, while bad external 
economic environment makes decision makers very passive 
F25 Policy 
environment 
National or regional policy environment is the basis on which the project 
lies. Different policies involved during the project period will directly 









A3.3     Assessing Contractors Performance 
 
 




• Technical expertise 
(SBW1) 
• Defects liability attitude 
(SBW2) 
• Site safety records 
(SBW3) 
• Successful past projects 
(SBW4) 
• Yearly turnover (SBW5) 
• Relevant work 
experience (SBW6) 
• Working capital (SBW7) 
Okoroh & Torrance, 1999, Palaneeswaran 
& Kumaraswamy, 2000, Fong & Choi, 




• Plant maintenance 
programs (PC1) 
• Work method statement 
(PC2) 
• Work's quality record 
(PC3) 
• Flexibility in the critical 
paths (PC4) 
• Failure to comply with 
quality specifications (PC5) 
• Failure in on-time 
delivery (PC6) 
Palaneeswaran & Kumaraswamy, 
2000, Cheng & Li, 2004, Holt et al., 




• Tender quality (QP1) 
• Tender timeliness (QP2) 
• Safety Initiatives record 
(QP3) 
• Quality control and 
quality assurance 
programs (QP4) 
• Query response 
timeliness (QP5) 
• Failure to perform safety 
requirements (QP6) 
Hatush & Skitmore, 1997 and Alarcon & 
Mourgues, 2002 
Past performance • Length of relationships Holt et al., 1995 and Kumaraswamy & 
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Factors Attributes/indicators Source reference 
(PP) (PP1) 
• Regulation knowledge 
(PP2) 
• Turnover fluctuations 
(PP3) 
• Time in business (PP4) 
• Overall trade experience 
(PP5) 
• Past record of conflicts 
and disputes (PP6) 
Matthews, 2000;Greenwood (2001) 
Overall project 
success (OPS) 
• On-time project delivery 
(OPS1) 
• On budget project 
delivery (OPS2) 
• Desired quality 
outcomes (OPS3) 
• Cost savings (OPS4) 
Holt et al. 
 
 
 
